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ABSTRACT 
This study aims to explore, and to a certain extent to 
.:, r 
clarify, what it means psychologically to experience 
Traumatic spinal cord injury (TSCI) in a South African 
spinal unit. The target time chosen for analys~~·is the 
acute medical period. The study presents a review of 
the literature on psychological adjustment to TSCI and 
then proceeds to introduce and extensively articulate the 
hermeneutic approach and methodology. Subsequently, an 
interpretive research strategy is present~d for the purpose 
of studying the acute phase of TSCI. The data £or the 
study was obtained by means of three dialogical interviews 
which were tape recorded, transcribed and analyzed with~n 
a cyclical framework consisting of three interdependent 
levels. The interpretive procedure is modeled upon the 
'reading guide' developed by Brown, Tappan, Gilligan, Miller 
and Argyris (1989). The analysis follows a course from __ 
the individual psychologicil descriptions of the experience 
to the generation of a general, nomothetic narrative account 
of the acute phase. The findings are then discussed in 
relation to the existing literature and evaluated on the 
basis of the goals of the study. The study highlights 
the value of some of the 'stage' ways of thinking about 
SCI adjustment, while simultaneously stressing the need 
for placing adjustment within a more personalized, and 
individually meaningful context. Significant differences 
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between the psycho-physical experiences of patients in 
the categories of complete and -incomplete SCI were found, 
which suggests that a sharper distinction be made in the 
literature between these two groups, in order to account 
for the marked variations in their experiences.-- ~he study 
also contains a number of shortcomings, such as a lack 
of understanding about certain historical and contextual 
factors which may have mediated the experiences of the 
trauma for the individuals concerned. 
These shortcomings and some suggestions fdr their resolution 
are then discussed. The study concludes with an evaluation 
of the research strategy and methodology and also offers 
some suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
.< 
1.1 FORMULATING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Traumatic Spinal Cord Injury (TSCI), if complete, causes 
permanent motor paralysis and loss of sensation_below the 
level of injury (Zejdlik, 1992). It is so physically 
catastrophic, that until recently few persons managed to 
survive the trauma of injury. As a result of recent medical 
advances however, and a subsequent increase in the survival 
rate of the .spinal cord injured, investigations into the 
psycho-social dimensions of the experience have become 
salient concerns for the rehabilitation context and 
community (Roessler, 1978). 
The aim of the present study is to explore and to a c~rtain 
extent to clarify what it means psychologically to 
experience TSCI in a South African spinal unit. The target 
time chosen for analysis is the acute medical period, i:~. 
the initial bed ridden phase immediately following the 
onset of injury. The investigation was conducted for the 
following primary reasons: (1) the literature on emotional 
responses appears to be contradictory (Du Preez, 1985), 
(2) very little research has been conducted on the acute 
phase (Buchanan and Nawoczenski, 1987) and (3) much of 
the existing research has been carried out within a natural 
scientific framework. I shall now expand upon each reason 
individually, thereby giving this problem formulation 
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greater clarity. 
1) To date, many investigators have been pre-occupied with 
the task of attempting to prove the existence of sequential 
stages in the adjustment process, for example shock, denial, 
depression and acceptance; the result being the_pr.apogation 
of various related stage theories (Du Preez, 1985). Other 
researchers have attempted to fit emotional reactions into 
theoretical constructs, for example the psychodynamic model 
developed by Pepper (1977) and the trauma model described 
by Hamburg and Adams (1967). Others have advocated a more 
~hdividualistic approach to underst~nding TSCI. These 
theorists have argued that persons who sustain spinal cord 
injuries tend to adjust idiosyncratically to the trauma~ 
. ~. 
and they have stressed the fact that we currently possess 
incomplete knowledge about the psychological consequences 
of SCI (Du Preez, 1985; Somers, 1992; Trieschmann, 1980). 
(2) While much has been written about the acute phase of.. 
psychological adjustment to SCI, very little empirical 
research has been conducted (Buchanan and Nawoczenski, 
1987). It is known that individuals during the acute phase 
experience pain, persistent sensory and sleep deprivation, 
a lack of time cues and social isolation; all of which, 
when combined with the shock induced by the trauma and 
the effects brought on by powerful psycho-active medications 
produce profound and complex changes in cognitive 
functioning, emotional response and behaviour (Brown and 
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Hughson, 1987; Somers, 1992). 
At present, we also lack an understanding of vital 
subjective human elements in the SCI experience (Du Preez, 
1985). We do not know, for instance, how the intensity 
of emotional reactions affects and impacts upon-the 
adjustment process (Bracken, Shepard and Webb, 1981), and 
we also do not know what these various reactive phenomena 
mean for the people experiencing them (Du Preez, 1985). 
This is due, in part at least to the fact that much of 
the existing research has been conducted ~ithin a natural 
s~ientific framework. 
(3) While natural scientific methods, notably the extensive 
use of questionnaires, standardized interviews, clinical 
observations and diagnostic processes have provided us 
with much insight and knowledge into the nature of the 
SCI experience, they have failed to provide us with a 
complete, (i.e. complex and meaningful) understanding oE-
the phenomenon. The fact that reactions to and experiences 
with TSCI tend to be highly idiosyncratic and contingent 
upon a variety of experimentally uncontrollable 
physiological, psychological and socio-cultural factors, 
suggests that quantitative statistical procedures, given 
their proneness to contextual abstraction and preference 
for generalizable results are an inadequate means for 
illuminating the meaning of experiences as profound, complex 
and specific as TSCI. 
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1.2 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
In part, the method chosen_ depends on the problem being 
considered and on the goal of the investigation. As the 
purpose of this study is to generate a meaningful and 
phenomenologically sensitive account of the aCUEe phase, 
_a qualitative hermeneutic approach has been employed. 
This approach makes use of an interpretive procedure which 
offers a way of operationalizing the hermeneutic circle, 
(i.e. the essential circle of understanding) by building 
up an interpretation ofa whole interview narrative out 
of its constituent parts. It is a structured interpretive 
procedure which allows for the exploration of experience 
both within and across interviews by means of an ordered" 
and systematic 'reading guide'. The hermeneutic stance 
and the reading guide are discussed in detail in the method 
section of this paper. 
1.3 DEFINING KEY TERMS 
At this juncture, the need for conducting the present study 
has been articulated and motivated. I shall now take this 
opportunity to define certain key terms and concepts which 
will provide the reader with a greater understanding of 
what spinal cord trauma entails. When one speaks of spinal 
cord trauma one is usually referring to the physiological 
or anatomical aspects of the injury. While this study 
is concerned primarily with the psychological dimension, 
a brief description of the physical side is required as 
this assists one to understand spinal cord injury in a 
holistic manner. 
1 • 3 • 1 The Spinal Cord 
The spinal cord extends from the medulla oblongata to the 
level of the L1 or L2 vertebra. It is comprised- df various 
nerves providing common pathways for controlled movement, 
sensory input and reflex responses. The cord acts as a 
bi-directional communication cable, carrying motor messages 
from the brain to the peripheral nervous system and sensory 
messages from the peripheral nervous syste~ to the brain. 
When the cord is injured, messages are unable to pass the 
level of injury as the brain has no means of connecting 
with body parts below the point of severance (Somers, 1992; 
Zejdlik, 1992). 
1.3.2 The Vertebral Column 
The spine consists of 33 individual and fused vertebrae 
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which share common characteristics and are grouped accor.ding to 
location and function. There are seven Cervical, twelve 
Thoracic, five Lumbar, five Sacral and four Coccygeal 
vertebrae. The vertebrae of the sacrum and coccyx are 
fused in the adult to form the tail bone. Ligaments, 
together with cartilaginous disks bind the vertebrae 
together. These disks act as shock absorbers and weight 
bearing structures; i.e. as cushions protecting us from 
the jars of everyday life (Du Preez, 1985; Zejdlik, 1992). 
Spinal cord injuries are divided into a number of categories 
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depending on the nature, extent, and level of injury. 
While it is rare for cord injured individuals to fit neatly 
and wholly into a clearly delineated categorical niche, 
the bulk of cord injuries may be divided into three 
categories or groupings. These are: ( 1) Parapl..egia, (2) 
Tetraplegia/Quadriplegia, and (3) Complete or Incomplete 
SCI. 
1.3.3 Paraplegia 
Paraplegia entails either a partial or complete loss of 
sensation and voluntary .muscle control of the trunk and 
lower limbs, bladder and rectum, as well as impairment 
of sexual functioning in males (Du Preez, 1985). 
1.3.4 Tetraplegia/Quadriplegia 
Tetraplegia entails either a partial or complete loss of 
sensation and voluntary muscle movement in the arms, trunk, 
lower limbs, bladder and rectum, in addition to paralysis 
of the sympathetic nervous system and loss of sexual 
function in males (Du Preez, 1985). 
1.3.5 Complete Or Incomplete/Partial SCI 
When the cord is completely severed, total paralysis ensues 
beneath the point of injury. When the cord is partially 
or incompletely severed, the resumption of normal 
functioning is sometimes possible. The extent of functional 
return is, however, difficult to ascertain in patients 
with incomplete SCI, as recovery is contingent upon the 
physiological peculiarities inherent in each individual 
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case. 
As stated previously, the _bulk ~f SCI research to date 
has been conducted within a natural scientific framework. 
Researchers have relied heavily upon experimentation, which 
is a quantitative procedure borrowed from natural ·science. 
_Within this approach, the researcher creates an experimental 
situation in which relevant 'factors' are identified, 
controlled and manipulated in a manner allowing for certain 
aspects of performance to be measured. While it seems 
possible to obtain valid and objective data by using this 
method, numerous researchers, most notably those working 
within the phenomenological and hermeneutical schools have 
argued that such procedures tend to distort complex human 
phenomena by ignoring or covering up essential features 
of the subject matter. These features include the subjects 
consciousness; i.e. the meaning of the phenomenon for 
the person concerned (Du Preez, 1985). As meanings are--
"inherently and irremediably" context contingent, (Mishler, 
1979, p. 3) phenomenologically oriented researchers have 
warned against the use of procedures which tend to 'press' 
human actions into systems of ideas in which human elements 
disappear (Kruger, 1979). In order to generate a 
contexually s'ensitive and existentially meaningful account 
of the acute phase of TSCI, the present study will utilize 
an interpretive procedure which allows for the meaningful 
exploration of human action, situated in text and context. 
_Through the use of such a prosedure, the researcher Ls 
able to explore and illuminate the idiographic/nomothetic 
tension inherent in this particular type of trauma and 
also develop a more complex understanding of some bf the 
-problems involved in the acute phase. 
The purpose of this study then is twofold: (1) to generate 
8 
a meaningful and phenomenologically sensitive account of 
the acute phase, and (2) to articulate a qualitative or 
hermeneutic mode of research, which is of value in research 
such as this. 
CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
A review of the literature reveals a relatively large body 
of work focusing on four primary aspects of TSCI. These 
-are: (1) emotional reactions, (2) sexual adjustment, (3) 
vocational adjustment and (4) rehabilitation. While the 
studies on sexual and vocational adjustment are relevant 
to an understanding of the dynamics of the SCI experience 
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as a whole, they are less pertinent with respect to the 
present investigation, as most of the sexual and vocational 
studies deal with issues which only assume existential 
precedence for the cord injured person during the periQd 
immediately subsequent to the acute phase of the trauma, 
i.e. during the rehabilitation phase which is characterized 
by intensive occupational-therapy and physiotherapy. As 
the present study is focused upon exploring patients' 
experiences with TSCI during the acute phase, the studies 
on vocational and (later) sexual adjustment will not be 
discussed further at this juncture. In order to 
appropriately situate the acute phase psychologically within 
the context of rehabilitation as a whole, the relevant 
studies concerning rehabilitation will be incorporated 
into the discussion section of this paper. For this reason, 
the literature review will be selective rather than 
comprehensive. 
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The review will be divided into two sections. The first 
section deals with the literattire discussing the various 
psychological or emotional reactions to TSCI. Within this 
section particular emphasis will be placed on examining 
the numerous stage theories of SCI adjustment, a~·these 
theories have historically moulded our conceptions and 
thinking about the psychological consequences of SCI. 
The second section deals specifically with the literature 
discussing those reactions and phenomena most frequently 
encountered during the acute phase. 
2~2 Emotional Reactions Following TSCI 
To begin with, there are some researchers who have attempted 
to fit emotional reactions into theoretical constructs, -
for example the trauma model described by Hamburg and Adams 
(1967). The essential feature of this model is that it 
is applicable not only to SCI but to traumatic experiences 
in gen€ral, for example: childhood experiences of 
separation and rejection, illness and injuries of childhood, 
illness and death of loved ones, pregnancy and retirement, 
among others (Du Preez, 1985, p.14). According to Hamburg 
and Adams (1967), an individual who experiences any type 
of trauma will be confronted with the following primary 
tasks : (1) keeping distress within controlled limits, 
(2) retaining a sense of personal worth, (3) rebuilding 
relationships with significant others, (4) surmounting 
critical tasks and (5) making effective use of one's 
opportunities (Du Preez, 1985, p.14). Hamburg and Adams 
(1967) used clinical observaticns and systematic studies 
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to obtain their results, i.e. questionnaires and the T.A.T. 
(Thematic Apperception Test). stewart (1977-78) is one 
researcher who utilized this model to study the-- -
psychological consequences of TSCI. He describes the 
achievement of tasks as a series of operations involving 
three interlacing themes, namely denial, depression and 
restitution, which mayor may not be mutually exclusive 
(Du Preez, 1985). The aim of this coping behaviour is 
the maintenance of a cohesive sense of self, i.e. something 
which may take a substantial period of time to achieve. 
stewart (1977-78) obtained his data from previous research 
and theory and integrated it into the above mentioned model 
to "arrive at his conclusions. 
Working on the assumption that the cord injured individual 
experiences a natural regression as a result of the trauma, 
Pepper (1977) developed a psychodynamic model for 
correlating the developmental tasks of the infant, child 
and adolescent with the emotional adjustments of the cord 
injured patient (Du Preez, 1985). Based on Erikson's first 
three psycho-social phases (Erikson, 1968), Pepper's model 
works on the epigenetic principle. This principle holds 
that psycho-social progress is contingent upon the 
surmounting of critical tasks inherent in each developmental 
phase. Although Erikson proposed eight such stages, each 
expressed as a crisis or dichotomy, related to an 
-ego-strength, an organ mode ap? a psycho-pathology, Pepper 
(1977) limited her discussion to the first three. The 
three tasks are: (1) Trust vs. Mistrust (2) Autonomy vs. 
Doubt (3) Initiative vs. Guilt. Each of these stages will 
-now be discussed in turn. 
2.2. 1 Trust vs. Mistrust 
Immediately following the onset of the trauma, the cord 
injured person finds himself/herself in a position of 
extreme dependency and helplessness. The individual's 
situation is therefore analogous to that of the infant. 
Physical dependency on others results in a psychological 
weakening of the ego, which is exacerbated by the fact-
that the patient must repeat the developmental tasks of 
childhood in a hospital setting. This physical and 
psychical dependency fosters an emotional regression to 
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an earlier stage of development. This view is consistent 
with Berger and Garret's (1952) observations which revealed 
that spinal cord patients frequently exhibit immature, 
passive, submissive, dependent, impulsive and egocentric 
behaviours. 
2.2.2 Autonomy vs. Doubt 
While in the hospital, the cord injured individual is 
usually placed on a rigid therapy schedule. He/She must 
contend with the vagaries of catheterization in addition 
to bowel and bladder retraining. As Erikson's second stage 
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is characterized by an opposition between retentive and 
eliminative tendencies, pr?gress in bowel and bladder 
control and in physical mobility represents an advancement 
in autonomy, thereby triggering improvements in self 
control, self-esteem and ego-reformation. Also-important 
at this stage is the dichotomy between self control and 
control by the hospital staff. Excessive staff control 
may result in an internalization which creates compulsivity 
and rigidity in the patient. Anger and anxiety may become 
manifest as the patient.doubts his/her ability to cope, 
and the ability or willingness of others to help him/her 
(Du Preez, 1985). 
2.2.3 Initiative vs. Guilt 
Pepper (1977) identified guilt as the primary danger of 
the third phase. During this period, when the cord injured 
person has regained some sense of composure and self 
control, confusion about the ability to perform sexually--
may complicate interpersonal relations. Catheterization 
and the lack of privacy makes masturbation or other sexual 
activity extremely difficult (and potentially painful). 
The loss of sexual function, or the fear of this loss may 
therefore reactivate the guilt experienced during the 
Oedipal phase. Freud (1905) pointed out that the sense 
of guilt in the neurotic is often attached to the memory 
of some masturbatory activity during puberty. As 
masturbation represents the executive agency of infantile 
sexuality in it's entirety, it is able to take over the 
sense of guilt attaching tD it. Thus the danger here is 
that the patient may believe that the injury is punishment 
for some past (sexual) wrongdoing (Pepper, 1977). 
Although the assumption that regression is 'norrna[' or 
_even 'requisite', is far from generally accepted, Pepper 
(1977) claims that there is much clinical evidence to 
support it. The necessarily intense medical and nursing 
care which SCI patients experience, combined with the 
catastrophic nature of the trauma, places the cord injured 
individual in a dependent position demanding a radical 
realignment of self concept and body image. Regression 
provides the patient with an opportunity to reintegrate-
his/her ego into the new reality situation and also to 
form new expectations and set attainable goals. Pepper 
(1977) has argued that correlating the SCI adjustment 
process with the tasks of psycho-sexual development may-
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be able to account for much of the behaviour of cord injured 
patients and thereby contribute to our understanding of 
what these patients experience as a result of the trauma 
(Du Preez, 1985). 
The next group of researchers to be discussed are those 
who have suggested that the cord injured individual responds 
to the disability in a kind of stage sequence. Fink (1964) 
and Pierce and Nickel (1977) have divided the coping process 
into four key stages. These are, according to Fink (1964) 
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(1) shock, in which psychological functioning becomes frozen 
or is retarded, (2) defensive retreat, in which denial 
of the disability is paramount, (3) acknowledgement, in 
which the disability is recognized as permanent, and (4) 
adaptation, in which the individual accepts the-new reality 
situation and integrates it into his/her personality (Fink, 
1964). 
During the phase of defensive retreat, Fink postulates 
that the cord injured individual will be relatively free 
of anxiety and depression, and that anxiety and depression 
will become manifest during the acknowledgment phase. 
Guttmann (1973) conducted extensive studies on the 
psychological reactions of cord injured war veterans. 
His findings were based on individual interviews with 
patients, written reports, clinical observations and 
extensive experience with the target population. According 
to Guttmann (1973) a number of primary factors are important 
in determining the psychological or emotional reaction 
pattern of the cord injured person. These are: ( 1) the 
pre-traumatic personality, (2) mental ability, (3) 
education, (4) social status, (5) occupation and (6) age; 
in addition to the type and extent of the paralysis and 
the efficacy of the initial treatment phase (Guttmann, 
1973, pp. 42 - 44). With respect to reactive phases, 
Guttmann identified two distinct stages, namely 'stage 
of shock' and 'stage of realization' (Guttman, 1973, p. 
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44). Spinal shock is the cord's immediate response to 
the injury. Approximatel~ 30 tb 60 minutes following the 
-.:, r 
injury, edema develops, which causes physiologic transection 
of cord function (Cardona, 1985). During the shock phase, 
initial awareness of the consequences of the injury may 
be dulled due to the overwhelming nature of the trauma. 
The patient may have difficulty absorbing all the 
implications of the injury, a condition which some 
clinicians have attributed to 'denial' (Hammell, 1995). 
In Guttman's view, the initial shock phase is followed 
by a period of superficial awareness which gradually 
increases with a realization of the extent of the injury. 
Denial, anger and depression are thought to accompany the 
stage of realization, yet these reactions are not allotted 
separate status as with most of the other stage theories 
(Du Preez, 1985; Guttmann, 1973). 
Weller and Miller (1977) claim to have identified five 
distinct satges through which the cord injured individual 
must pass in order to reach "the ultimate goal of 
psychological adjustment to the changed physiological state" 
(Weller and Miller, in Du Preez, 1985, p. 17). These are, 
according to Weller and Miller (1977): (1) shock (2) denial 
(3) anger (4) depression and (5) acceptance. Furthermore, 
Weller and Miller have stated that in the acute care phase, 
no more than one or two stages may be experienced. Weller 
and Miller based their findings on observations of 
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thirty-seven SCI patients who were admitted to New York 
-Uni versi ty' s. spinal ward and 9~ the basis of their past 
experience with the cord injured population. Bracken, 
Shepard and Webb (1981) empirically examined affective 
reactions to spinal cord injury •. Their results indicated 
-that emotional reactions correlated positively with severity 
of motor and sensory disability. Most patients exhibited 
anger, anxiety and depression, all of which were found 
to be related to the injury. The results were obtained 
by conducting interviews with physicians, staff and 
patients, and by the use of standardized questionnaires 
and rating scales (Du Preez, 1985). These authors state 
that their study represents an important first stage ~n' 
quantifying many of the clinical observations frequently 
cited in the research literature. They suggest, however, 
that the study be replicated and expanded to include 
additional data, particularly information concerning the 
intensity of emotional reactions and their impact upon 
the natural course of adjustment to the trauma (Bracken, 
Shepard and Webb, 1981; Du Preez, 1985). 
Up until this point, our discussion of the literature on 
psychological reactions has been confined primarily to 
the stage theoretical perspective. These theories have 
been challanged however, and recent research seems to 
support the notion that the stage theory of adjustment 
is inaccurate (Sommers, 1992). Trieschmann (1980) has 
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stated that there appears to be m6re speculation than 
evidence regarding the existenc'e of stages, and she has 
. . 
identified numerous methodological flaws, such as the 
'investigator paradigm effect', the 'experimentor expectancy 
bias' and the erroneous assumption of SCI grouprhomogeneity, 
which cast serious doubt on the validity of the stage 
theories. 
Numerous authors have stressed the fact that each SCI 
patient is unique (Buchanan and Nawoczenski, 1987; Hohmann, 
1975; Trieschmann, 1980). It is probable therefore that 
adjustment will tend to be multi-faceted and highly 
idiosyncratic. As outcomes are contingent upon the complex 
interface between personality~ injury related and 
environmental factors, many authors maintain that it is 
impossible to speak of a uniform or predictable 
psychological response pattern to SCI. This means that 
we need to redirect and focus attention away from 
predetermined categories and stages and move towards placing 
adjustment within an individually meaningful context. 
With this idea in mind, attention will now be given to 
a discussion of the literature relating specifically to 
the dynamics of the acute phase. 
2.3 Psychological Reactions During The Acute Phase 
2.3.1 Regression 
Perhaps one of the clearest and most frequently observed 
early reactions to SCI is the phenomenon of regression. 
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Buchanan and Nawoczenski (1987) have stated that regression 
can be directly observed in "the alert and oriented patient" 
within the initial 48-72hr period following the injury 
(p. 190). Regression has alternatively been defined as: 
(1) becoming more childlike and dependent, (2) losing 
_control, (3) losing reinforcement, (4) becoming egocentric 
and (5) becoming focused on more basic levels of need 
(Buchanan and Nawoczenski, 1987). Although regression 
is commonly considered to be a negative phenomenon, it 
serves a psychologically useful and important function 
for the recently cord injured person by providing him or 
her with the ability to tolerate, at least to a certain 
extent, the overwhelming loss of control, the unknown 
environment and personal distress encountered as a result 
of the trauma (Buchanan and Nawoczenski, 1987, p. 190). 
In addition to regression, numerous other early reactions 
to TSCI have been observed. Chief among these are: ( 1)- -
shock, (2) anxiety, (3) anger, (4) grief/mourning, (5) 
hypersensitivity to small cues, (6) psychosis, (7) 
depression and (8) denial. Each of these reactions will 
now be discussed in turn. 
2.3.2 Shock 
As stated previously, some researchers have spoken of a 
shock phase with accompanying reactions. Shock is the 
initial crisis recognition. According to Du Preez (1985), 
"it is a state of daze wherein clear thinking is retarded 
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if not completely abolished" (p.20). During this phase, 
which may last for hours or for days, the individual is 
incapable of acknowledging, or refuses to recognize the 
extent of the injury. Pierce and Nickel (1977, p. 44-48) 
have called this the "pre-shock and shock" phase~.'· When 
the psychological threat of danger is recognized the patient 
begins what Rigoni (Pierce and Nickel, 1977) calls the 
"shock phase" of coping, which he considers to be the first 
stage of adjustment (Du Preez, 1985, p.20). 
2.3.3 Anxiety 
Anxiety occurrs on a continuum from mild anxiety to panic 
(strange, 1987). It is characterized by a set of emotions 
and physical disturbances experienced in response to an 
unidentifiable threat on the part of the patient. strange 
(1987) has stated that mild anxiety may be beneficial as 
it characteristically heightens the patient's awareness, 
thereby helping him/her to deal effectively with actual __ 
physical or emotional threits (strange, 1987, p.287). 
As anxiety approaches panic however, it may render the 
patient incapable of dealing with the precipitating factor, 
or the anxiety itself without outside intervention. 
According to Siller (1969), anxiety is one of the foremost 
reactions to physical traumatization and is readily 
observable in the recently cord injured patient. Anxiety 
may be related to basic needs for air, food and comfort, 
or to biological threats, disturbances in self concept, 
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or non-injury related factors (strange, 1987, p. 287). 
2.3.4 Anger 
Anger is another frequently cited early reaction to TSCI. 
According to Du Preez (1985), anger surfaces when the 
patient's ability to deny the disability begins~to break 
_down. Weller and Miller (1977) have stated that the 
response of anger may be indicative of a highly motivated 
individual with a powerful self-image struggling to exercise 
some control over his or her destiny. 
2.3.5 Grief/Mourning 
All patients who experience physical trauma, whether it 
be TSCI, amputation of a limb, or any other disabling 
condition will tend to mourn their losses and all will 
probably experience grief. Ham and Cotton (1991) have 
described mourning, or bereavement, as a normal reaction 
by which the patient begins to meet the loss which has 
occurred. Mourning is not a state, but a process, invo!ying 
time and a number of overlapping 'tasks' or 'phases'. 
Worden (1983) has identified four main tasks which are 
involved in the bereavement process. These are: ( 1) to 
accept the reality and finality of the loss, (2) to 
experience and work through the pain of grief, (3) to adjust 
to an environment in which the loss is absent, and (4) 
to withdraw emotional energy and invest it in other 
activities or relationships. While there are important 
differences concerning the way in which different 
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individuals cope with loss, Worden (1983) has argued that 
there are three overlapping pr~mary stages in the grieving 
process. The first stage, which he calls "Numbness" usually 
occurs 2-3 days following the injury. This is similar 
to Pierce and Nickel's 'shock phase' in which p?y~hological 
functioning becomes frozen, or is retarded. "Despair" 
is stage two in Worden's model. This stage is highly 
complex, involving intense peaks of anguish and distress. 
Feelings of sadness, anger and frustration, guilt and self 
reproach, anxiety, loneliness, fatigue and helplessness, 
~hock, pining, emancipation, relief, and/or numbness are 
believed to be compounded by disturbing physical sensations, 
a loss of energy and depersonalized states in which 'nothing 
feels real'. These reactions may further be accompanied 
by cognitions or thought patterns of disbelief, confusion 
and preoccupation or hallucinations and behaviours such 
as sleep and appetite disturbances, social withdrawal, 
vivid dreams, crying and/or restlessness. The final stage 
in Worden's model is "Recovery". During this stage, the 
individual accommodates the changes neccessary for 
adaptation and reconstructs the new reality situation in 
light of the loss experienced. Worden admits however, 
that it is impossible to predict an average time for 
completion of the grieving process, as so many factors 
are unique to each individual case (Ham and Cotton, 1991, 
p. 148-149). In some cases however, grieving does not 
end, and the typical grief reaction is replaced by the 
.~ atypical one. The atypical grief reaction has been 
described by Ham and Cotton (1991) as either: ( 1) a 
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prolonged reaction, where after a substantial period of 
time recovery is not seen, or (2) a delayed reac~tion, often 
_ relating to persistent denial of the reality and finality 
of the loss, and/or (3) increased and persistent feelings 
of self blame and guilt, which if left unresolved could 
contribute to depressive illness (Ham and Cotton, 1991, 
p. 149). 
2.3.6 Hypersensitivity To Small Cues 
A further predictable response to SCI is hypersensitivity 
to small cues. When the terrain is unfamiliar, everyth~ng 
is potentially important. Thus expressions, moods, comments 
and gestures assume a variety of possible meanings. 
"Anything could mean anything" depending on how the patient 
views it (Buchanan and Nawoczenski, 1987, p. 192). 
2.3.7 Psychosis 
For some patients, the combination of sleep and sensory 
deprivation, immense pain, shock and psycho-active 
medications is simply overwhelming .. In a 1980 study, 
Trieschmann found that sixteen percent of recently cord 
injured patients experienced psychotic episodes within 
the first two weeks of injury. The majority of these 
episodes were, however, short lived and did not appear 
to engender long term adjustment problems (Trieschmann, 
1980). 
2.3.8 Depression 
Depression is often cited as a normal consequence of SCI 
(Polletts, 1985; Roberts, 1972) and plays a central role 
in many of the stage theories of adjustment. Depr~ssive 
states are thought to be characterized by a lowering of 
self-esteem and feelings of fatalism, helplessness and 
hopelessness (Du Preez, 1985). According to the stage 
theories, a certain period of depression is required for 
a healthy adjustment to SCI. Consequently; anyone who 
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does not display depression is thought to be in denial. 
While this view is consistent with knowledge gained from 
experience with psychiatric populations, the SCI group 
cannot, on the whole, be compared with a psychiatric 
population, as they are heterogeneous and display very 
little classic psychopathology (Buchanan and Nawoczenski, 
1987). Furthermore, recent research has strongly challenged 
traditional concepts about the role of depression. 
Taylor (1967) conducted a study of young cord injured males 
using the MMPI (Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory). His results indicated that cord injured males 
displayed profiles similar to those of uninjured males 
on any university campus. Little evidence of depression 
was found. 
Bourestom and Howard (1965) compared the personality 
characteristics of three disability groups, namely TSCI, 
rheumatoid arthritis, and multiple sclerosis using the 
MMPI. Their results indicated ~hat persons with spinal 
cord injuries exhibited the most benign MMPI profiles. 
Dinardo (1971) found that persons who displayed evidence 
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of depression were independently rated as less well adjusted 
than their counterparts who tended to suppress or repress 
their emotions (Trieschmann, in Bloch and Basbaum, 1986). 
Lawson (1978) investigated the incidence, severity and 
pattern of depression in ten quadriplegic patients 
throughtout the hospitalization period. Four measures 
o"f depression, i.e. self reports, biochemical, behavioural, 
and reports by others were obtained from each patient on 
a daily basis. The results indicated that patients 
experienced mild depression following admission and prior 
to discharge. Depression was therefore found to be only 
a minor factor in the overall behavioural adjustment pattern 
of these patients. Furthermore, the measure on staff 
ratings revealed that hospital staff consistently 
overestimated the amount of emotionality actually present 
(Trieschmann, in Bloch and Basbaum, 1986). 
Howell, Fullerton, Harvey and Klein (1981) evaluated twenty-
two patients with recent cord injuries by means of 
standardized interviews and diagnostic processes. 
Psychiatrists conducted the interviews, utilizing the 
schedule for affective disorders and schizophrenia. Their 
results indicated that no patient experienced a severe 
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depressive episode following the injury, and that only 
twenty-two percent (five patients) exhibited mild depressive 
reactions of a temporary or situational type. 
The notion that individuals must experience a certain amount 
of depression in order to achieve a healthy adjustment 
to SCI has therefore not been consistently substantiated 
by rigorous scientific research. Numerous authors have 
stressed the fact that each SCI patient is unique. It 
is probable therefore, that the meaning of depression or 
any other emotional reaction will vary from person to 
person. In one individual depression may be a means for 
marshalling strength, while in another it may signal 
failure. (Buchanan and Nawoczenski, 1987, p. 193). Each 
case therefore requires a careful understanding of personal 
idiosyncratic features and the meanings associated with 
'specific experiences. 
2.3.9 Denial 
Denial is another frequently cited reaction in the 
literature which has hardly been the subject of any 
research. Wittkower (1955) has stated that denial is always 
the first response to SCI. Hohmann (1975) concurs with 
this view while describing denial as a normal response 
to an abnormal situation (Zedjlik, 1992, p. 156). 
Psychologically speaking, denial entails a subconscious 
repression of reality in either a physical or emotional 
sense. It is usually considered to be a maladaptive device 
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for protecting the ego from overwhelming anxiety. Yet 
denial is not necessarilY,a negative phenomenon. It,may 
also serve a positive function, i.e. it may enable the 
recently cord injured individual to deal with what is 
momentarily tolerable, by keeping him or her from"being 
overwhelmed in a manner which impairs overall functioning 
(Buchanan and Nawoczenski, 1987). 
2.4 Explaining The Acute phase 
Meyerson's (1971) work on unknown situations is one of 
the more creditable approaches to understanding the dynamics 
of the acute phase. Building on earlier work by Lewin 
(1938), Meyerson predicts common patient reactions on the 
basis of known responses to unknown situations. As tha 
cord injured individual is thrown into an alien environment 
which he/she does not understand and has no basis in 
experience to comprehend, he/she does not know how to react 
to gain reinforcement. In learning theory terms, the 
behavioural sequence required for goal attainment from 
the environment has not been learned. As the location 
of environmental rewards is unknown, the means for securing 
these rewards will tend to be haphazard, tentative, and 
idiosyncratic (Buchanan and Nawoczenski, 1987). Without 
an outlet for the frustrations inherent in a situation 
such as SCI, anger is likely to become internalized and 
transformed into depression. In Meyerson's view, anxiety 
and extreme behaviour are a manifestation of the patient's 
inability to contend with, or psychologically structure 
the unknown. Because st~ucturing the unknown is 
psychologically fundamental, the only limits to extreme 
behaviour are the patients imagination and the staff's 
tolerance (Buchanan and Nawoczenski, 1987). Tfi~s~ an 
understanding of the patient's goals will usually help 
to reduce and eliminate extreme behaviour (Buchanan and 
Nawoczenski, 1987, p. 191). 
In the past, most of the psychological literature dealing 
with adjustment to SCI tended to minimize the importance 
of the acute phase. The patient was assumed to be in a 
state of 'shock' or 'denial' which precluded him or her 
from accomplishing any meaningful emotional change or 
adaptation. This assumption has been challenged however, 
and recent clinical evidence seems to support the notion 
that the process of psychological adjustment begins quite 
early, with early interventions influencing adjustment 
in both the short and long term (Buchanan and Nawoczenski, 
1987; Kemp, 1971). 
Guttmann (1973) identified a number of primary factors 
which he found to be important in determining the 
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psychological reaction pattern of the cord injured patient. 
One of these factors was the quality and efficacy of the 
initial treatment phase. Additional evidence to support 
the idea that acute phase management is significant comes 
from a number of individual descriptions of adjustment. 
One patient, an individual with high quadriplegia, enjoyed 
an active and successful life p~ior to SCI. He described 
his "fear and terror" after being routinely turned one 
night by nursing staff who forgot to return his 
environmental control sip-and-puff straw. Envi~onmental 
control systems are appliances and devices which enable 
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the severely disabled to exert control over and interact 
with their environment (Hammell, 1995, p. 21). This patient 
had a tracheotomy and was afraid that if something happened 
to him, he would be unable to call for help. His fear 
turned into panic and then frightening hallucinations and 
delusions. This individual continued to have anxiety 
attacks, particularly at night, for the rest of his life 
'" (Zejdlik, 1992, p. 154). 
Another patient described how she was helped by a nurse 
who responded to her delusion and hallucination that some 
flowers on a table were on an altar at a funeral. She 
could not sleep and requested that her bed be moved and 
that her mother be called to the hospital. Although it 
was very late at night, the nurse acceded to her requests 
and the patient's mother arrived. After a short while, 
the patient relaxed and was able to drift off to sleep 
(Zejdlik, 1992, p. 154). Yet another patient described 
"terrible nights" during the acute phase when the 
medications and his physical condition resulted in 
hallucinations and extreme discomfort. He recalls a nurse 
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who showed her concern by taking extra time to talk with 
him and sit ?y his bed. These actions decreased his -
anxieties and enabled him to sleep more easily (Zejdlik, 
1992, p. 125). Zejdlik (1992) has argued that sleep should 
be given priority not only in the critically ilI~ but also 
_in spinal cord patients. As sleep is a restorative process 
(Zejdlik, 1992) and dreaming a compensatory mechanism for 
bringing to light the "unconscious contents which are causal 
factors" in neuroses (Jung, 1933, p. 3), sleep deprivation 
should be seen as a major impediment to effective 
rehabilitation. Further evidence stressing the significance 
of the acute phase comes from insights stemming from the 
field of crisis response and stress management. Accord±ng 
to this view, all individuals seek to achieve a state of 
physical, social and psychological equilibrium (Zejdlik, 
1992, p. 157). A crisis is a state' of disequilibrium or 
imbalance which occurs when there is an "incongruency 
between the problem solving or coping skills of the 
individual, his family system, and the stressful event" 
(Harmon, 1985, p. 246). A situational crisis develops 
when a specific external event upsets the individual's 
psychological and physiological equilibrium. Zedjlik (1992) 
has described crises as occurences which result in states 
of emergency and incapacity in spinal cord patients, and 
she has advanced the argument that successfull management 
of a crisis will improve the patient's ability to cope. 
Conversely, unsuccessful management of a crisis may 
-reinforce maladaptive respons~.patterns. Crises thus have 
"growth promoting potential" (Zejdlik, 1992, p. 157). 
As an individual in crisis searches for a resolution to 
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it in the form of equilibrium, the type of balance achieved 
-may represent either a healthy, growth promoting adaptation, 
or a maladaptive one (Zejdlik, 1992). 
As the acute phase represents the first opportunity for 
promoting growth oriented coping strategies in the cord 
injured patient, its significance for the overall course 
of psychological adjustment should not be underestimated. 
In view of this fact, and considering the relative paucity 
of phenomenologically sensitive research on the tQpic, 
it seems imperative that research endeavours be initiated 
in order to enhance our understanding of this controversial 
and complex phase of the SCI experience. 
2.5. Purpose Of The Study 
As stated previously, the purpose of this study is to 
provide the reader with a meaningful and phenomenologically 
sensitive account of the acute phase of TSCI. This 
investigation should complement and augment existing 
research in the area by developing an understanding of 
some of the problems involved in the acute phase, and by 
generating ideas about how to resolve them. 
The hermeneutic approach will now be discussed at length 
in order to give the reader a greater understanding of 
its focus and mode of operation in the field of psychology. 
CHAPTER THREE 
METHOD 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
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The purpose of this chapter is to articulate a hermeneutic 
method of research and to describe a research strategy 
and form of data analysis appropriate for the study of 
the acute phase of TSCI. In order to achieve the first 
objective, I have provided the reader with a fairly in 
depth methodological juxtaposition between hermeneutics 
and the twin perspectives of rationalism and empiricism. 
This has been done in order to articulate, clarify and 
justify the use of a specifically interpretive methodology 
which (in many respects) differs radically from the mor~ 
traditional approaches. An understanding of this debate 
has bearing on the present study as many of the 
methodological problems associated with the traditional 
approaches have been carried over into the field of SCI -
research. For this reason the chapter will be divided 
into three parts. The first aims at describing the 
hermeneutic approach and therefore contains the 
aforementioned debate. The second aims at clarifying 
important hermeneutic concepts and takes the form of a 
description of (five) key characteristics which are 
cornerstones of this approach. The third aims at examining 
and defining the criteria for evaluating interpretive 
accounts and also makes explicit the research strategy 
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and form of data analysis used in the present study. 
3.2 Describing The Hermeneutic'Approach 
.,:, r 
Hermeneutics has been defined as the science or the art 
of interpretation (Mahoney, 1991). Hermeneutic approaches 
therefore differ radically from traditional (rat.ianalist 
and empiricist) forms of inquiry by calling into question 
and subverting the traditional view of method as 
interpretation free procedure or technique. The hermeneutic 
approach may be usefully explicated by comparing and 
contrasting the ways in which interpretati~n, rationalism 
and empiricism construe four primary areas, or domains 
of knowledge. These are (1) the domain of inquiry, (2) 
the origin or source of knowledge, (3) forms of explanation, 
and (4) the manner/method of inquiry deemed to be most 
appropriate for the investigation of human action (Packer 
and Addison, 1989). Each of these categories will now 
be discussed and dealt with in turn. 
3.2.1 Domain Of Inquiry 
Each type of systematic investigation, either explicitly 
or implicitly contains assumptions about the characteristics 
of the domain under study. The stance of empiricism, for 
example, assumes that the world is comprised of basic 
elements and objects which can be described in a manner 
involving no interpretation (Packer and Addison, 1989; 
Terwee 1990). Thus the objects of empiricist inquiry are 
independent entities with absolute properties existing 
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outside of, and quite apart from, the realm of human 
interests, practices and concerns. The task of scientific 
psychology, from this perspective, is to objectify these 
elements and describe their properties and interactions. 
Upon closer examination however, we find there to be a 
hidden context to empiricism, i.e. a conceptual grounding 
in the tenets and suppositions of seventeenth century 
mechanistic science. According to this view, physical 
objects (human beings included) are believed to possess 
context independent properties such as size, position, 
In-ass and velocity, in addition to personali ty traits, 
intelligence quotients and attachment strengths which may 
be categorically or quantitatively assessed using simp~~ 
psychometric tests and measures. The assumption here is 
that such measures provide us with an objective means for 
investigating human action in a manner allowing for the 
precise prediction of subsequent behaviour, i.e. given 
the existence of specific requisite conditions which may 
be brought about through experimental manipulations (Packer 
and Addison, 1989). While it seems possible to obtain 
valid and objective data by using this method, hermeneutic 
theorists have long argued that this type of naive 
mechanistic realism practices, in effect "a terrible form 
of violence" (Levin, 1988) when transplanted wholesale 
into the realm of human scientific inquiry, as it 
oversimplifies and distorts complex human experience to 
.--- --- - - . - - --:-~ -.--.----~---- - -~ -" 
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the point of absurdity. Seen from this angle, empiricism 
~ppears more-as a crude nalveby, than as the only tru~, 
objective way of seeing the world and some theorists, as 
a consequence, have argued against its usefulness and 
appropriateness in the field of contemporary psychological 
-research. 
Where empiricism seeks to uncover lawful relations in an 
unquestionably objective universe, rationalism seeks to 
construct or reconstruct portions of human knowledge and 
experience. Rationalists are concerned with abstracted 
formal structures, i.e. 'competence' or 'deep' structures 
which are believed to underlie performance. In 
structuralist research, (one ~ontemporary form of 
rationalism) the aim is to provide an orderly reconstruction 
"which introduces clarity and indubitability" into a realm 
seemingly "filled with ambiguity and error" (Packer and 
Addison, 1989, p. 17). Thus speech, for Chomsky (1957) 
and action, for Piaget (1977), are mere occasions of 
performance which are distorted by "errors, memory 
constraints and other cognitive limitations" (Packer and 
Addison, 1989, p. 17). From the rationalist perspective, 
competence structures have a formal character and are 
composed of syntactic rules and elements (Williams, 1978). 
Piaget (1970), a major proponent of this view, has described 
these structures as "not observable as such, being located 
at levels which can only be reached by abstracting forms 
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of forms or systems of the nth degree." Which is another 
way of saying that the detection of structure calls for 
"a special effort of reflective abstraction' (Piaget, 1970, 
p.136). 
The central criticism of rationalism has been t6a~ when 
human action is separated from its context, it becomes 
distorted as opposed to clarified. In the words of Musil 
(1930/1979), the cost of abstraction is that the object 
is "mummified" as everything becomes when it is "torn out 
of context" (Musil, 1930/1979, in Packer and Addison, 1989, 
p.- 18). From the hermeneutic perspective, action and 
context are inseparable. Performance and setting cannot 
therefore be artificially compartmentalized or teased ~p~rt 
without producing consequences which subvert the aims of 
rationalist inquiry. As practical activity is intrinsically 
linked to context and has "a complex termporal 
organization," interpretive inquiry, in contradistinction 
to the more traditional forms, focuses on "human activity, 
situated in context and on the offspring of such activity," 
i.e. "institutions, histories, accounts, records, texts, 
stories, and lives" (Packer and Addison, 1989, p. 19). 
Consistent with a hermeneutic approach, the present study 
will concern itself with an analysis of the acute phase 
of TSCI as situated in text and context, i.e, as situated 
in texts of interview narratives in which patients' 
experiences with the phenomenon are discussed and described. 
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The texts will first be transcribed and then analyzed within 
a cyclical framework consisting' of three interdependent 
levels, the aim being the generation of a meaningful and 
phenomenologically sensitive account of the acute phase 
of TSCI. For a more detailed exposition of the interpretive 
procedure used for the present study, see section 3.4.6 
of the present chapter. 
3.2.2 Origin/Source Of Knowledge 
Empiricism claims to have identified an epistemological 
foundation for scientific inquiry on the basis of 
unquestionable observables, or brute facts which are 
immediately given to the senses (Packer and Addison, 1989).-
Taylor (1979) has described these facts as: 
data whose validity cannot be questioned by 
offering another interpretation or reading, 
whose credibility cannot be founded or 
undermined by further reasoning. If such a 
difference of interpretation can arise over 
given data, then it must be possible to 
structure the argument so as to distinguish 
the basic, brute data from the inferences 
made on the basis of them (Taylor, 1979, p. 30). 
While data of this kind are often taken as the basis for 
theory in much contemporary psychological research, the 
claim that any data are self evident, unambiguously 
_observable a.nd recordable wi tlJC?ut interpretation is 
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untenable. Even in the natural sciences, i.e. what logical 
positivists see as the epitome of value free descriptions, 
apparently objective and interpretation free descriptions 
~re known to be contingent upon contexts of particular 
kinds (Packer and Addison, 1989). In the words of Hansen 
(1958), observations are intrinsically "theory loaded," 
with successive theories being incommensurate "in the sense 
of requiring radical translation between superficially 
equivalent terms" (Packer and Addison, 1989, p. 21). With 
the paradigm shift from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics, 
basic terms like 'mass' and 'inertia' changed their me.aning 
and are now understood differently as a consequence (Kuhn, 
1970) . Thus positivist attempts to catalogue and describe 
observables in an objective manner have run into serious 
difficulties. This argument has relevance for the field 
of SCI research, as attempts to catalogue and pigeonhole 
psychological reactions into neatly defined mood states 
have failed to provide us with a complex and meaningful 
understanding of the experience. 
Rationalism too makes foundational claims. Yet rationalist 
assertions rest not upon putatively self evident 
observables, but rather on the consistent procedures of 
formal logic. Claims of certainty and indubitability 
permeate the rationalist enterprise, which has sought to 
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establish a "scaffolding of indubitable formal principles," 
from which structures that recopstruct human phenomena 
may be "logi-cally generated"{Packer and Addison, 1989, 
p.21). Upon close examination however, the logic of 
formality turns out to be flawed. Hermeneutic tl)e~orists 
have long argued that formal logic cannot bear the weight 
which rationalists wish to heap upon it and that formal 
structures, as a consequence, cannot provide us with a 
foundation for knowledge, either of the world or of the 
mind (Packer and Addison, 1989, p~ 22). Relativity theory 
h~s shown that it was a mistake, i.e. what Rosen (1987, 
p. 153) calls "the shipwreck of formalism" which led to 
the erroneous belief that logical propositions somehow 
correspond to, or match reality. Consequently, we see 
that the explanatory power of rationalism rests not upon 
indubitability, but rather on its contingent and convenient 
choice of axioms (Nagel and Newman, 1958). 
Some hermeneutic theorists have argued that scientific 
inquiry cannot attain and does not require an 
epistemological foundation. As human affairs are 
intrinsically ambiguous and discourse inherently 
metaphorical (being contingent upon linguistic usage), 
these theorists have argued that interpretation is an 
intrinsic, unavoidable and essential accompaniment to human 
understanding (Caputo, 1987). As human phenomena are 
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inextricably embedded in the social practices of the home, 
-workplace an.d society, hermeneutic researchers see practical 
-: ~ 
understanding as the appropriate starting place for 
scientific inquiry. Interpretive inquiry therefore begins 
at a place delineated by our everyday participaE~ry 
-understanding of people and events, rather than from an 
absolute origin of unquestionable data or totally consistent 
logic (Packer and Addison, 1989, p. 23). 
3.2.3 Explanatory Forms 
In empiricist inquiry, an explanation has been provided 
when observation statements have been linked to form 
theoretical statements (Packer and Addison, 1989, p. 24). 
Thus, empiricist explanations assume the form of 
hypothesized lawful statements concerning relationships 
of co-occurence. Conceived as statements of regularity 
in the form of general laws, these explanations exhibit 
the formal characteristics of predictions, i.e. predict±ons 
which have been tested empirically through observation. 
In contradistinction to empiricism, rationalism provides 
explanations in the form of algorithms, or sets of rules 
whose relationship to the domain of inquiry is that of 
formal logic to a set of statements deducible from its 
axioms (Packer and Addison, 1989). 
One striking criticism of both rationalist and empiricist 
explanations is that causal laws and formal reconstructions 
are only what they purport to be, i.e. interpretation free 
or fully explicit descriptions of reality if the objects 
~hey take as_their elements a~~ uninterpreted ones. From 
the hermeneutic stance, every human action always embodies 
an interpretation, albeit an often concealed and 
misunderstood one (Heidegger, 1927; Packer and Addison, 
-1 989 ) . The possibility of interpretation-free description 
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is therefore incommensurate with a hermeneutic and 
historiological conception of science, which views 
understanding as both a projective and reflective 
process,and objectivity as an untenable fiction. As 
interpretation deals not with objective elements or formal 
structures, but with "thick concepts" which tend to "meld 
fact and value" (Williams, 1985), interpretive explanat,i'bns 
are thickly descriptive and narrative in form. 
Macintyre (1984) has argued that "it is because we all 
live out narratives in our lives and because we understand 
our lives in terms of the narratives that we live out that 
the form of narrative is appropriate for understanding 
the actions of others" (Macintyre, 1984, p. 211). Thus, 
in order to identify and understand what someone else is 
experiencing, hermeneuticians always move towards placing 
a particualar episode in the context of a set of narrative 
histories, i.e. histories both of the individuals concerned 
and of the environmental settings in which they act and 
suffer (Packer and Addison, 1989). Consistent with this 
view, the present study will make use of a method which 
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builds up an interpretation of an entire interview narrative 
_out of its c9nstituent parts,<~hereby making it possible 
to understand each work, indeed each sentence more 
thoroughly than before. As an understanding of the whole 
and the part are always interdependent (Terwee,r19~O), 
-the interpretive procedure is always fundamentally and 
essentially circular (Dilthey, 1976, p. 259 - 262). 
At this stage, arguments have been examined expressing 
the view that both rationalism and empiricism systematically 
exclude and deny context and setting while seeking to attain 
solid epistemological foundations upon which to construct 
scientific knowledge, and that bot~ these perspectives 
use explanatory forms in the guise of elements and rule~ 
~~ 
which seek to avoid interpretation and the supposed taint 
of human evaluation. The case for a hermeneutic conception 
of science has also been presented, expressing the argument 
that both rationalism and empiricism unavoidably require 
interpretation of the phenomena they aim to explain while 
consistently denying that they do so. Attention will now 
be given to an examination of the type of method used in 
each form of inquiry, and thereby to an illumination of 
some of the more purely methodological problems. 
3.2.4 Manner Of Inquiry Deemed Most Appropriate 
Both empiricist and rationalist forms of inquiry consider 
method to be germane to the attainment of foundational 
knowledge and to the systematic generation of appropriate 
kinds of explanations. In empiricist inquiry, procedures 
~re initiatep which are desig~~d to experimentally 
manipulate, analytically disjoin and identify regularities 
among data which meet strict and objective criteria, i.e. 
usually levels of statistical significance. Rafionalist 
-inquiry, on the other hand defines formal principles which 
serve as the basis for an "axiomatization of the domain 
under investigation" (Packer and Addison, 1989, p. 27). 
The intention of both these methods is however the same, 
namely to generate objective knowledge, i.e. knowledge 
which is untainted by the vicissitudes of human judgement 
and evaluation. At this juncture a consideration of the 
mode or stance of the researcher within these two 
orientations would shed some light on the aforementioned 
problem. In both forms of inquiry, 'detachment' is 
considered to be an essential prerequisite for generating 
objective and unbiased descriptions. But is detachment--
objective and unbiased? - and does it lead us to our goal, 
i.e. knowledge and understanding? 
Hermeneutic theorists have long argued that detachment 
does not guarantee objectivity and leads to distortion, 
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as opposed to clarity. Nagel (1986) has called detachment 
"the view from nowhere" as being value neutral, free from 
prejudice, objective and unbiased, to the small extent 
that these are possible at all, "involves adopting a special 
posture of distance from, or denial of one's personal 
interests and concerns, and being unconcerned or 
~isintereste~ is as little- ac~~eved through procedures 
and techniques as is being concerned" (Nagel, in Packer 
and Addison, 1989, p. 27). From the Hermeneutic stance, 
detachment is willful blindness, i.e. it is a dIstorting 
-move which removes or covers up the cultural, personal 
and social involvements which enable us to understand one 
another in the first place (Packer and Addison, 1989, p. 
1 2 ) • Heidegger (1927/1962) has argued that detachment 
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is an unwitting attempt io establish the kind of engagement 
known as 'the present at hand,' which is a mode of distance 
from oneself and the world of practical activity. As 
engagement in this mode is both derivative and privative, 
Heidegger argued that it is only able to provide us with 
a shadow of the kind of understanding which is possible 
through concerned involvement (Packer and Addison, 1989). 
This problem of detachment is further compounded by a 
conundrum implicit in the age old correspondence theory 
of truth, i.e. a theory to which both rationalism and 
empiricism tacitly subscribe. According to this theory, 
the aim of method is to employ techniques and procedures 
which assess correspondence with a reality which is 
independent of the researcher. Yet how is this to be done? 
John Locke (1690/1975), a major proponent of this view, 
saw the problem himself when he wrote, "It is evident that 
the mind knows things not immediately, but only by 
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intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge 
-is therefore real only so ~ar a~ there is conformity .between 
our ideas and the reality of things" (Locke, 1690/1975, 
in Packer and Addison, p. 28). But what is the criterion 
for assessing this reality? As Locke himself pG.t~it, "How 
-shall the mind, when it perceives nothing but it's own 
ideas, ~now that they agree with the things themselves?" 
(Locke, in Packer and Addison, 1989, p. 28) 
From the hermeneutic perspective this conundrum is 
insoluble, as factual states of affairs cannot be 
objectively described by a human evaluator. Explanatory 
accounts cannot therefore be validated (in the traditional. 
scientific sense of the word) on the basis of establishing 
degrees of correspondence with a reality independent of 
the researcher, as the researcher unavoidably proceeds 
from a point ·of view/perspective which, existentially 
speaking, cannot simply be wished away. Even the much-
vaunted "logic of falsification" (Popper, 1959) cannot 
overcome this limitation. 
In rationalist inquiry, reconstructions are assessed on 
the basis of their ability to show consistency and 
completeness. First, the system must demonstrate that 
if follows its own rules, and secondly, its output must 
accord with "intuitions of correctness," i.e. with the 
"intuitive knowledge of competent subjects" (Habermas, 
1979, p. 9). Yet intuitions, at best, provide us with 
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no more than a dubious procedure for validating formal 
explanatory reconstructions. One reason for questioning 
the validity of intuitions lies in the problematic and 
indefensible rationalist assumption that accuarate intuitive 
knowledge of the operation of certain segments 6f~our 
cognitive apparatus is possible. As this assumption 
overlooks the likelihood that even competent researchers 
may have only a partial, incomplete or distorted 
understanding of themselves, or of what they are doing, 
hermeneutic theorists have argued that intuitions are an 
unsatisfactory means for assessing the validity of formal 
reconstructions (Packer and Addison, 1989). It is also 
for this reason that mathematicians have long engaged irr 
efforts to replace intuitions of validity with formal proof 
(Hahn, 1933/1980). 
In view of their unsubstantiated claims to have located 
indubitable epistemological foundations and methods based-
upon interpretation free procedures and techniques, some 
theorists have advanced the argument that rationalism and 
empiricism are fundamentally "ideological stances" (Packer 
and Addison, 1989, p. 31). As research conducted within 
these frameworks deals not so much with what is done in 
systematic inquiry, but rather with what is wished could 
be done, it follows that method cannot be reduced to pure 
procedure or technique and must, as a consequence, 
incorporate a central interpretive component. Viewed in 
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this manner, psychological inquiry inevitably turns out 
to involve the researcher formin'g "a relationship with 
, . 
the researched, and assessing, evaluating, communicating 
and acting upon what has been learned" (Packer and Addison, 
1989, p. 32). For this reason, it was decided tnat the 
present study would make use of a dialogical interview 
procedure which utilizes self-disclosure as a mechanism 
of concerned involvement. This should enhance the quality 
of the research relationship by helping to facilitate good 
rapport and also stimulate meaningful discussion. 
At this juncture, the hermeneutic approach has been 
descr~bed and contrasted with rationalist and empiricist 
forms of inquiry. It should be clear from the foregoing-
discussion that interpretive inquiry dispenses with much 
of the dogmatism (and methodological rigidity) inherent 
in the more traditional approaches and is concerned 
primarily with the analysis of human action, situated in--
text and context. The next part of this paper will expand 
upon and give clarity to the outlined orientation by 
discussing key elements which are cornerstones of the 
hermeneutic approach. 
3.3 Key Elements Of The Hermeneutic Approach 
While there is no singular hermeneutic method as such, 
all interpretive forms of inquiry share a number of key 
features which serve to identify them as hermeneutical. 
These are: (1) a consideration and operationalization 
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of the hermeneutic circle, (2) a focus on meaningful 
internal relations, (3) a ~oncern with individual cases, 
(4) a fusion of interpretive horizons, and (5) a concern 
with application (Terwee, 1990). 
3.3. 1 The Hermeneutic Circle 
In interpretive inquiry, the researcher's point of view 
and the evaluation of explanatory accounts are not seen 
as being separate, but as being engaged in a constant 
dialogue. Instead of being on opposite ends of a straight 
line, they are on the circumference of a circle, i.e, the 
hermeneutic circle. The forward arc of the circle consists 
in establishing a perspective, i.e,a point of view from 
which to proceed, with evaluation forming the reverse arc. 
Establishing a perspective is a forward motion because 
of a phenomenon which was identified and analyzed by 
Heidegger (1927), i.e. the phenomenon of 'projection'. 
According to Heidegger (1927), all understanding takes 
place within a horizon or framework which is 'projected' 
by human being (Dasein). As the possibilities for Dasein, 
literally 'being in the world' are ordered and organized 
by 'forestructures of projection,' which are existential 
structures shaped by our expectations, preconceptions, 
experiences, cultures and traditions, entities can appear 
to us "only insofar as a certain horizon of being has 
already been laid out for them in advance" (Packer and 
Addison, 1989, p.34). As projection is an existential 
structure, we are thrown into future ways of acting (and 
interpreting) by the possibilities inherent in it. This 
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is not to say that our forestructure determines, in any 
strict sense, what is uncovered in an interpretation, but 
rather that our understanding is innately limited by, and 
~ontingent upon, how we enter into and act within the circle 
of understanding. As the hermeneutic circle is not a purely 
epistemological or methodological structure, but primarily 
an existential one, hermeneutic theori~ts s~e it as the 
key to both scientific and everyday understanding (Packer 
and Addison, 1989, p. 33-34). Operationalized into a method 
of study, this circle operates as follows: first, the 
interpreter views phenomena as being parts which are 
dependent upon larger structures, i.e, the parts are 
dependent upon the whole. Second, the interpreter relies 
on his/her preconception of the whole in order to understand 
the parts and third, the interpreter feeds his/her 
understanding of the parts into the global preconception 
(Terwee, 1990). The procedure is unavoidably cyclical 
because it is regarded as impossible to begin anywhere 
on a firm basis. As the circle involves both assimilation 
and accommodation, it is complete, for "if we are 
persevering and open, our attention will be drawn to the 
projective character of our understanding, and - in the 
backward arc, the movement of return, we gain an increased 
appreciation of what the forestructure involves, and where 
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it might best be changed" (Packer and Addison, 1989, p. 
34; Terwee , 1 990, p. 1 1 6 - 1 1 7 ). . 
3.3.2 Meaningful Internal Relations 
Interpretation is directed towards the uncovering of 
meaningful internal relations between actions and·events, 
not to the uncovering of statistical, i.e. external 
relations. The interpreter looks for me'aning relations 
between words, actions and expressions as they appear in 
any given context, i.e. defined by the rules of the language 
game in question. An example of an internal relation is 
the relationship between an action and a motive, or an 
action and a belief. While empirical observations may 
reveal a contiguous or regular relationship between an 
'. 
action and a motive, we only speak of a 'good motive' if 
we are able to understand the action as springing from 
the motive, of course presupposing the existence of a 
cultural background (Terwee, 1990, p. 117). 
3.3.3 Individual Cases 
Since hermeneutics does not aim at predicting behaviour 
or at developing general laws, interpretation is usually 
directed at understand~ng individual cases. This 
idiographic focus does not, however, preclude the 
possibility of the interpreter generating a nomothetic 
narrative account, as the present study will demonstrate. 
Danziger (1985) has drawn attention to the strong belief 
among psychologists that aggregate data form the only 
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acceptable basis for making general theoretical statements 
about individuals. As a c?nsequence, individual cases 
tend to be excluded through sampling and experimentation, 
i.e. the real individual is sacrificed for the sake of 
the non-existent 'average' individual. This is ~f~ course 
not the only approach. One could just as well study 
individual cases first and then put the data concerning 
individuals together at a later stage, or even sample the 
actions or situations of a single individual (Terwee, 1990). 
3.3.4 Fusion Of Horizons 
Both the researcher and the researched are known to have 
a conception of Truth and of the World. As the author 
of a text has a claim to the truth of it, interpretation_ 
is seen as a dialogical process, i.e. a conversation between 
interpreter and text, subject and object, the aim being 
the removal of obstacles to understanding. A shared 
perspective is therefore the ideal aim. 
3.3.5 Application 
Interpretation is historical and aimed at transferring 
insights from the past into the present. Trying to 
understand a text as meaningful human reality means assuming 
that the text has something to say, i.e. that it has some 
claim to truth. The task for the interpreter then is to 
bring out this truth and apply it to the present situation 
(Terwee, 1990, p. 24). Interpretive research is therefore 
related to, but not identical with, other pragmatic and 
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proactive research approaches, such as emancipatory and 
~articipatory action research~ which seek to transform 
the research situation into a mechanism of empowerment. 
For this reason, an auxilIary goal of this study is to 
r- ~ 
contribute to the efficacy of the rehabilitation process 
-by developing a more complex understanding of some of the 
problems involved in the acute phase and by generating 
ideas about how to resolve them. 
3.4 Criteria For Evaluating Interpretive Accounts 
Before proceeding directly to an examination of the criteria 
for evaluating interpretive accounts, it would be prudent 
at this stage to first explain and clarify the hermeneutic-
conception of Truth, i.e. what hermeneutic theorists see 
as the aim of interpretive inquiry. If truth is not simply 
a matter of correspondence between a theory or account 
and the way things actually are, then should we dispense 
with the concept of truth altogether? Or is it possible-
to achieve a new understanding of truth, i.e. an 
understanding which surpasses the pitfalls of relativism 
while stripping away all metaphysical notions? (Packer 
and Addison, 1989, p. 278). This is precisely what 
Heidegger (1927) proposed to do in his 
hermeneutic-phenomenological analysis of being, in Being 
and Time (1927). In this work, Heiddeger attempted to 
demonstrate that the truth of any theory, interpretation 
or practical activity is not immediately apparent, but 
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is rather contingent upon a proces~ of 'uncovering'. The 
uncovering of an entity is -the r'eturn arc of the herm~neutic 
circle, it is our evaluation, our response to inquiry. 
Because interpretation "is a letting-something-be-seen, 
it can therefore be true or false fl (Heidegger, 1~27, p. 
96). But here everything depends on our steering clear 
of any conception of truth which is construed in the sense 
.of agreement. For Heidegger, the entities of inquiry must 
be taken out of their hiddenness, which is to say that 
they must be uncovered,unmasked, i.e. discovered. As 
interpretation is the "working out of possibilities 
projected in understanding, it shows entities explicitly, 
often for the first time fl (Packer and Addison, 1989, p •.. 
278) • This is not to say that a good interpretation is 
one which shows things as they 'truly are', but rather 
one which shows entities as they are capable of being shown. 
This view of truth is neither simple realism nor truth 
as coherence. What is crucial for truth as uncovering 
is an illumination of the way in which the entity shows 
itself. As Heidegger himself put it, the goal is "to let 
that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very 
way in which it shows itself from itself" (p. 58). Due 
to the nature and character of projection, entities are 
capable of showing themselves from themselves in many ways, 
depending in each case on the kind of access we have to 
them (Heidegger, 1927, p. 51). Heidegger argued that the 
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quality of our interpretation is contingent upon the type 
_of access w~ have achieved, i.e on the kind of entry ,into 
the circle which we made in the first place. What is 
uncovered in a true interpretation then is a solution to 
the problem, the confusion, the question with wnlch we 
-are concerned, the breakdown in understanding which led 
to the inquiry in the first place (Packer and Addison, 
1989, p. 279). 
With this conception of truth as uncovering in mind we 
may now direct attention ,to an examination of the criteria 
for evaluating interpretive accounts. Four approaches 
to and requirements of evaluation will be considered. 
These are: (1) coherence, (2) relationship to external-
evidence, (3) consensus, and (4) relationship to future 
events. Each of these requirements will now be discussed 
in turn. 
3.4.1 Coherence 
Coherence has also been called plausibility or 
intelligibility. It is a characteristic which all good 
interpretive accounts should demonstrate. While the 
requirement of coherence seems reasonable, it has 
nevertheless been criticized on the grounds that it fails 
to live up to a strenuous validation procedure, i.e. the 
kind of validation procedure favoured by 
empirical-analytical science (Packer and Addison, 1989). 
Hirsch (1967) has argued, that due to the projective 
55 
character of understanding, the perspective one has of 
~ reading will tend to confir~ ~tself, i.e. it will tend 
to focus on supporting evidence while ignoring discomfirming 
evidence. Thus an interpretation will inevitably lean 
-
towards coherence. The counter argument, however is that 
£irsch appears to exaggerate the problem. Packer and 
Addison (1989) have argued that,· in contrast to other kinds 
of understanding, like delusions for examaple, which are 
extremely self confirming, interpretation is only weakly 
self confirming. Whereas the deluded individual sees 
counter evidence as so threatening that he represses it, 
interpretive researchers employ stratagems to critique 
interpretations, thereby facilitating alterations in 
understanding. Coherence is therefore not inevitable in 
interpretive inquiry, as interpretive researchers show 
the negative side of articulation by searching for 
disconfirming evidence, i.e. by focusing on breakdowns 
and misunderstandings in the material (Packer and Addison, 
1989, p. 281 - 282). 
3.4.2 Relationship To External Evidence 
In order to avoid being trapped in the hermeneutic circle, 
Hirsch (1967) proposed that interpretations be measured 
against a "genuinely discriminating norm", i.e. one which 
is able to provide us with an interpretation free standard 
(Hirsch, 1967, p. 26). Hirsch himself suggested the ideal 
of attempting to understand what the author 'meant' or 
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'intended' by any given statement. While seemingly 
reasonable, this approach -leads' to a number of difficul ties, 
particularly if we are looking for a traditional type of 
validation procedure. The main difficulty lies in the 
question of how meanings can be identified. Ricover (1976) 
_has argued that "the intention in action no longer exists, 
~or it was present only at the time of acting" (Ricouer, 
1976, p. 100). As the intention is lost as a "psychical 
event", it cannot function as the norm by which 
interpretations may be evaluated. Even if we go back to 
the respondent or agent and ask him/her what was meant 
by a certain statement or action, he/she must recall, i.e. 
recollect and reconstruct what was meant. Thus the 
character of the author's intention will always remain 
open to re-interpretation (Packer and Addison, 1989, p. 
283) • This is not to say that appeals to the author's 
intentions are of no interest, but rather that such appe-als 
can only fail to provide us with the type of validation 
procedure sought by Hirsch and others. While respondents 
recollections remain open to further interpretation, they 
nevertheless constitute valuable material for interpretive 
inquiry (Packer and Addison, 1989). 
Some theorists have proposed that the agents current view 
of the situation provides us with a better norm than the 
one proposed by Hirsch. In this way it seems possible 
to avoid the problems of evanescent or quickly fading 
intentions (Packer and Addison, 1989, p. 283). Yet this 
view seems suspiciously close to the rationalist notion 
-that a valid interpretation ~s· one which corresponds to 
the intuitions of a competent person. The argument has 
already been made that intuitions are not capabl~of 
providing us with the certainty required of a validity 
-test and that the meaning of a te~t, the reality of any 
given situation, or even the informant's view of the 
accuracy of an account will.always be contingent upon 
interpretation. If our views and the views of informants 
are fundamentally disparate, it may well be that our 
interpretation is incorrect, yet we cannot discount the 
possibility that the disagreement is a result of the 
respondents' misunderstanding of their own activitle~;C 
either because certain aspects of their activities are 
hidden, or because defense mechanisms such as denial may 
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be at work (Packer and Addison, 1989, p. 284). This 
argument has relevance for research in the field of TSCI, 
as the various mechanisms of defense may possibly be 'built 
into' the adjustment process itself. At least, this is 
what many of the stage theorists would lead us to believe. 
It would be dangerous however to unquestionably assume 
that this is always the case, especially when there is 
strong evidence to the contrary. 
3.4.3 Consensus 
A convincing interpretation should be sensible and 
communicable, in a manner which allows others to interpret 
the material in a similar ligh~ (Packer and Addison, 1989; 
-Terwee, 1990). Yet this kin~ bf consensus should not be 
viewed as being equivalent to a traditional validation 
procedure, i.e. the assessment of inter-rater o~~ inter-
observer reliability. Agreement in this sense inevitably 
-leads to quantification and statistical abstraction, which 
in turn opens up the possiblity for "collective delusion" 
(Packer and Addison, 1989, p. 285). 
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Agreement, in and of itself is no guarantor of correctness, 
as evidenced by the large scale acceptance of certain 
prejudices and outdated theoretical beliefs. From the 
interpretive stance, a better interpretation is one which 
provides us with a more insightful analysis than rival 
interpretations (Taylor, 1979). Consensus, as a 
consequence, cannot be used as a metaphor or substitute 
for traditional reliability assessment, as further mater~~l 
may show an interpretation to be false, or rival 
interpretations may proceed from incommensurable 
perspectives. 
3.4.4. Relationship To Future Events 
Taylor (1979) has argued that predictive generalizations 
are an inadequate and unsatisfactory means for explaining 
human action, and more strongly that "meaningful prediction 
is impossible in human affairs" (Taylor, 1979, p. 90). 
He cites the examples of Glasnost in the former Soviet 
~~-.'~- -...... -.,-:: ~ ~ 
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Union and the introduction of computers into the world 
of business and education to emphasize the point that' major 
cultural innovation and transformation is unpredictable. 
As individual decisions affect social life at numerous 
levels, i.e. institutionally, culturally and personally, 
they are indeterminate. Pure contingency is a significant 
factor which cannot be 'controlled for' or simply wished 
away. Furthermore, predictions are unsatisfactory forms 
of explanation for another reason, i.e. they are always 
qualified by 'ceteris paribus' conditions, meaning that 
they hold true, 'all other things being equal.' This means 
that the scope of application of such predictions is 
extremely limited and ill-defined. Tn the words of Packer 
and Addison (1989, p. 26), predictive laws are "secondary 
phenomena, the results of social practices and institutions 
whose functioning is symbolic and representational, not 
causal • • they work, only because our understanding 
of the causal regularities of nature constrains social 
life." 
While interpretive inquiry is not concerned with predicting 
outcomes in the traditional mechanistic sense of the word, 
interpretive accounts may be evaluated on the basis of 
a "pragmatism criterion" (Fischer, 1987). As interpretive 
inquiry is intrinsically linked to practical activity and 
has an emancipatory (as opposed to instrumental) interest 
(Habermas, 1971), interpretive accounts may be judged on 
the basis of their ability to bring about changes in the 
_everyday lif.e-world of participants. Thus Lather (19.87) 
speaks of "catalytic validity" in which accounts are 
evaluated on the basis of their ability to "re-orient, 
focus and energize participants towards knowingrreality 
-in order to transform it" (Lather, 1987, p. 272). 
At this stage the criteria for evaluating interpretive 
accounts have been discussed and examined, and the notion 
of truth as 'uncovering' propounded. I have argued that 
this definition of truth and the evaluative criteria 
outlined above are both reasonable and applicable because 
they serve to direct attention and discussion towards 
considerations we value when evaluating interpretive 
accounts (Packer and Addison, 1989). As the purpose of 
the present study is to generate a meaningful and 
phenomenologically sensitive interpretive account of the 
acute phase of TSCI, it should be evaluated on the basis' 
of its ability to satisfy the criteria outlined above. 
If an answer has been uncovered, then the account should 
be found to be plausible. If it fits with other material 
then it should be convincing, and if it is convincing, 
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then it should affect our practices (Packer and Addison, 
1989). The final part of this method section will be 
concerned with describing and making explicit, the research 
strategy and form of data analysis used in the present 
study. 
3.5 Research strategy And Data-Analysis 
Introduction 
This section is divided into three parts. Its aim is to 
make explicit the research strategy to be followed for 
this particular study. The strategy consists of the 
- following three steps: (1 ) 
participation in the study, 
selecting subjects for 
(2) explaining the means by 
which the data/interview narratives will be obtained, and 
(3) explaining the interpretive procedure which will be 
used to analyze the data. These th~ee steps will each 
be discussed in turn. 
3.5.2 Selection Procedure 
Participants were located by means of a snowballing 
technique. Nursing staff at the H. F. Verwoerd Spinal 
Unit in Pretoria introduced me to a number of patients 
who were currently undergoing rehabilitation at the unit, 
of which two were selected on the basis of their abililty 
and willingness to speak about their experiences. The 
third participant also underwent rehabilitation at the 
same unit, although I met him by chance at a social event. 
Although the only criterion for selecting participants 
was personal experience with TSCI, certain categories of 
persons were excluded from the study. These were: (1) 
patients who suffered severe head injuries as a result 
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of the trauma, and (2) patients who lost significant others 
in the accident/event. Patients in the aforementioned 
categories were excluded from the study for two main 
reasons: (1) because of ethical concerns, and (2) b~cause 
the nature of their circumstances would prevent their 
descriptions from being exclusive to the phenomenon of 
TSCI (Du Preez, 1985). As interpretive research is 
exploratory in nature and aimed at understanding a diverse 
range of experiences, one complete paraplegic, one 
incomplete quadriplegic and one incomplete paraplegic 
patient participated in the study. 
3.5.3 Obtaining the data 
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Participants were told in everyday language what was 
required of them, i.e. they were asked to describe and 
discuss their initial experiences with the traumaand.cto 
focus on specific incidences, feelings, thoughts and 
memories, whenever possible. This method of asking subjects 
to 'describe' their experience has been illustrated by 
numerous researchers working within a phenomenological 
framework, for example De Koning (1979), Wertz (1983), 
and Colaizzi (1975). Du Preez (1985) is one researcher 
who used this method to study the general experience of 
TSCI in the South African context. She has argued that 
by giving patients the opportunity to describe incidents, 
one is giving them a concrete course to follow, i.e. one 
which should aid and assist them in this unusual and 
possibly difficult task. Participants will therefore be 
given as much or as little time as each requires to reflect 
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upon and respond to the questions posed. Consistent with 
a hermeneutic approach, a certain amount of self disclosure 
on the part of the researcher will be used as an avenue 
of access. As self disclosure is a mechanism of concerned 
involvement, it should help to establish good rapport with 
the participants and also facilitate a deeper level of 
discussion. Participants will be informed that the 
researcher is a former SCI patient with both a personal 
and scholarly interest in the phenomenon. In order to 
capture the meaning of the experience in all it's richness, 
the interviews will take the form of open-ended dialogical 
discussions which will be tape recorded and transribed 
for the purpose of textual 'fixing'. Paul Ricoeur (19791 
has argued that, as disourse (human action) may be recorded 
in the form of written texts, it leaves 'traces' which 
can be 'fixed' in various ways. Thus action itself, i.e. 
"action as meaningful, may become an object of science, 
without losing its character of meaningfulness, through 
a kind of objectification similar to the fixation which 
occurs in writing" (Ricoeur, 1979, p. 81). 
3.5.4 Interpretive Procedure 
The interpretive procedure is modeled upon the 'reading 
guide' developed by Brown, Tappan, Gilligan, Miller and 
Argyris (1989). The reading guide is a procedure which 
offers a way of operationalizing the hermeneutic circle, 
i.e. the essential circle of understanding, by building 
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up an interpretation of an entire "interview narrative 
out of its 60nstituent parts"'('Brown, Tappan, Gilligan, 
Miller and Argyris, 1989, p. 144). It is a structured 
interpretive procedure which allows for the exploration 
of experience both within and across interviews by means 
of an ordered and systematic reading guide. The first 
level of interpretation involves two interwoven steps: 
(1) the writing of a summary for each individual interview 
narrative, and (2) the asking of specific questions of 
each written protocol; in this instance the question, "what 
does the interview reveal about the meaning of the 
experience for the person concerned?" The second level 
of interpretation entails a reading across interviews~ 
i.e. comparing and contrasting experiences for the purpose 
of identifying themes, patterns, flows and directions in 
the material. The third, and deepest level of 
interpretation involves the writing of a general, nomothetic 
narrative account of the acute phase of TSCIwhich reflects 
both the researcher's and the participants' understandings 
of the phenomenon, situated in appropriate cultural and 
social context. Difficulties encountered during the 
interviewing process, and reflections on the study's 
shortcomings will be structured into the discussion. The 
findings will be discussed in relation to the existing 
literature and made available to the H. F. Verwoerd Spinal 
Unit for circulation and possible incorporation into their 
rehabilitation program. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
- INTERVIEW NbRRATIVES AND THEI~ ANALYSES 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter contains three descriptive summaries of the 
experience of the acute phase of TSCI and their analyses. 
-For the full texts of the transcribed interviews, the reader 
is referred to Appendices A, Band C. Due to ethical 
considerations, namely the need for anonymity, the three 
individuals who provided the descriptions will be referred 
to as follows: 
Subject A 
Subject Band 
Subject C . 
Subject A is a female paraplegic (T11 - complete). She 
was 15 years old at the time of the interview and had been 
hospitalized for eight weeks. 
Subject B is a male quadriplegic (C3 to C4 - incompletef: 
He was 36 years old and had been hospitalized for seven 
weeks when I interviewed him at his bedside. 
Subject C is a male paraplegic (T12 to L2 - incomplete). 
He was 34 years old when the injury occurred. I spoke 
to him at his horne two and one-half years after the event. 
4.2 Systematic Interpretive Analyses 
4.2.1 Summary. Subject A_ 
A was at the community hall and there was a fight outside. 
She heard gunshots and ran. Then she felt herself "being 
hit." As A fell down, she felt an "electric" shock in 
her back and a loss of feeling in her legs. Only after 
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A saw blood, however, did she realize that she had been 
shot. A tried to move her legs but could not. She realised 
that she was "all alone" and she felt "scared." Someone 
called an ambulance which took A to the hospital. At the 
hospital, they stuck pipes into her and she felt "terrible 
pain" in her back. At that point, A was "afraid" for her 
"life." She worried that she would not "be able to wake 
up again." Then A was operated upon. After the operation, 
A was told that she would never walk again. A was 
devastated by this news and she says that she couldn't 
believe it. At the same time, A stated that she wanted--
to walk. A says that she was "very depressed" and that 
she cries when she thinks of what has happened to her. 
Also, A stated that it helped her to be among the other 
spinal patients. Being with them made A realise that she 
was "not the only one." A teacher comes to see A every 
day and she does schoolwork. A says that she thinks a 
lot about what has happened to her and doesn't know whether 
her visitors help her. For instance, when they ask A what 
happened, she thinks about the shooting and starts to cry. 
A also stated that sometimes, when "somebody slams the 
door" she thinks "that i t-' s a shot and then it happens 
again" and that sometimes, when she is "outside" and sees 
"somebody fighting" she experiences the same reaction all 
over again. 
4.2.1.1 What does the interview reveal about the meaning 
of the experience for Subject A? 
When A lost feeling and movement in her legs she stated 
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that she felt "alone" and "scared." This 'fear' and 
'aloneness' may therefore be of an existential type, meaning 
that A became aware that she was fundamentally alone in 
the world, or alternatively, it may mean that A felt 
literally/situationally alone, in the usual sense of noE 
being in the presence of concerned others. This feeling 
of aloneness was followed by, or accompanied with worry, 
i.e. fear/anxiety. The existential interpretation of A's 
feeling fundamentally "alone" is reinforced by her next 
reaction, which is the specific fear of death. A worries 
that she will not "wake up again." A also experienced 
"terrible pain" in her back. Following the operation, 
A was told that she would never walk again. To this she 
reacted with disbelief and denial. Disbelief because she 
stated explicitly that she couldn't believe it and denial 
because she expresses a desire to walk without having the 
physiological capacity to do so. Depression ensued 
following A's realization that the disability may be 
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permanent, and it is clearly still present. What is clear 
from A's de~cription is that ?~e appears to be suffering 
from Post Traumatic stress Syndrome. This interpretation 
is reinforced by the fact that the traumatic event is 
-
triggered and the anxiety/fear invoked by it, 'reexperienced' 
- each time A hears a door slam or sees a fight going on 
outside. 
4.2.2 Summary. Subject B 
Just after the accident, B was lying in the veld and he 
couldn't "feel" or move anything from the neck downwards. 
He asked someone where his left arm was and she replied, 
"it's right next to you." B repeated that he couldn't 
"feel anything" at that point, and expressed his disb~lref, 
by saying "I couldn't believe it." He tried to move his 
legs but couldn't. After being taken to the hospital, 
B was X-Rayed and given an injection, which made him feel 
like he was "far away." B does not recall much of that 
stage however. B recalls waking up at night and being 
in traction with a halo device on his head. At this point 
the Doctor informed B and his wife that he would never 
be able to use his hands or legs again. B couldn't believe 
it, but also "couldn't do anything" about it. That night 
B talked to himself and told himself again that he "couldn't 
believe it." He also closed his eyes and prayed. The 
next morning B was lying in bed and he felt something, 
but he didn't know where the feeling was. It felt like 
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his legs were someone "elses", but also that "the life 
was coming back." First l? regained an altered sort ()f 
feeling and movement in his right side, right arm and right 
leg. It felt like "pins and needles" and only after three 
or four weeks did B start feeling his left side--"come back." 
Then, suddenly, one day, B tried to move his wrist and 
succeeded. He felt himself getting stronger as he regained 
new movement and feeling. Up until the time B's left leg 
"came back", he stated that he struggled with the idea 
of walking. He couldn't see himself walking with only 
one arm and one leg, but he alsocouldn '"t see himself 
sitting in a chair all day. B prayed and tried to stay 
"positive". Initially, after the accident, B felt pain_ 
in his neck and upper arms. B describes the pain as an 
altered sensation, i.e. "if you press your finger on my 
arm it's like you're pinching me." He also described how, 
when he was turned, it felt like "a wild animal tearing--
him apart" or people "trying to pull off" his arms. B 
also experienced immense pain when they took off his first 
halo and put on his second. B is positive that he will 
walk again. Perhaps in light of this possibility, B states 
that his experience with the trauma has been 90% positive 
and 10% negative. Initially, B thought that he was getting 
a lot of attention because he was a "special person." 
Later on however, he didn't like it. All the intrusive 
questions people would ask and the impossible and "stupid" 
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things they would try to get B to do, like "pick up his 
leg" or touch his "left ear with his right hand over his 
head" upset him, as he felt like he was being treated as 
a "joke", or a guinea pig. He didn't know the reason why 
people were doing this to him as he was just "lying on 
his back spending time" for "no reason." It made B feel 
as if there was something "wrong" with him, or his visitors, 
"like they can't believe what they see." B stated that 
during the first week, a lot of family came to see him 
and couldn't believe wh~t they saw. When they cried it 
made B feel "negative" and "down." ·B placed things in 
perspective for them however, i.e. he told them that it 
happened, that nothing can be done about it and that they 
shouldn't cry because it hurts him inside. On the positive 
side, B began to "believe" and "trust" in himself as a 
result of his return. He felt himself "getting stronger" 
i.e. regaining more feeling and movement each day. This 
made him feel like he was "winning." The "only thing" 
B "couldn't do" at that stage was move his wrist. B 
described how he felt "stupid" one day because his physio 
asked him to do something which he couldn't do. Yet B 
succeeded in doing the very same thing the following day. 
B described the sensation in his left leg as "normal" and 
the sensation in his right leg as "stupid." B also 
describes his boredom, particularly after lunch when he 
has nothing to do. He can't "pick up a book properly and 
:~:..---" .. -. 
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read," so he lies in bed counting the holes in the roof 
~nd working on his weak point~. B says that he still- can't 
believe that he's getting stronger each day, but he feels 
it and "knows" it as a consequence. This feeling B 
. 
described as "winning." Because B keeps winning, he keeps 
-telling people that he will "stand on his own two feet 
and walk." B also described the early stages, i.e. his 
first three weeks of having the catheter in and not being 
able to urinate on his own as "very difficult." He couldn't 
move or feel his hands properly and therefore struggled 
with bladder control and "everything" in the genital area. 
B referred to his hands as "stupid" at that stage. After 
three weeks, B succeeded in urinating without help. Th±~s 
made him feel "beautiful," i.e. like he was "winning," 
like he could "do it" because he had "control of 
everything." B stated that his visitors "cannot understand" 
what he's experiencing, but that those of us who have be~h 
? 
through it, and the doctors and nurses do. B thinks about 
a lot of things while he lies in bed. Things like building 
pens for his animals on the plot, memories of when he was 
seven years old, when he lost his playing gun and couldn't 
find it for three weeks. He also stated that he often 
thinks of what he would have done, if he had known at age 
seven that he would break his neck at age thirty three. 
B also thinks of his wife and children, and of his father 
who had a spinal injury in exactly the same place as B. 
B also thinks of the heavy work he used to do and about 
the accident itself, which he u sees when he closes his 
eyes." B stated that he still "can't believe" that it 
happened, i.e. that it was "a stupid thing," which could 
have been avoided. B describes feeling "confus-edc"and 
stupid" immediately following the accident, and of the 
early stages he doesn't recall much. He also stated that 
he has been forgetful lately, i.e. that he listens to his 
wife, but that he cannot remember some of the things she 
says. This bothers B because his wife is·"part" of him. 
B says that maybe he got a bump on the head, because 
sometimes he feels "stupid," but that he thinks it will 
"go away." B says that he wouldn't wish what happened 
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to him on his "worst enemy." He doesn't know why it 
happened to him, "but it happened." B also discussed his 
life before SCI, and described working and being in 
dangerous situations where he "could have broken" his 
"neck," but never even got hurt. B says his accident shows 
that it can happen to anyone, that the "biggest thing he's 
gotten out of the" experience is that a lot of these 
accidents are "avoidable," but that people just don't think 
about it. B stated that he learnt that everyone was mortal, 
that no one was "God's gift to earth," or made of "steel" 
or "invincible" and that this, he learnt in the hospital. 
4.2.2.1 What does the interview reveal about the meaning 
of the experience for Subject B? 
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Immediately after the accident, B could not feel or move 
anything from the neck downwards. He asked someone where 
his arm was which suggests that B literally felt himself 
to be a 'disembodied head' at that point. B also reacted 
with disbelief to the doctor's assertion that he-would 
never use his hands or legs again, but he knew that he 
"couldn't do anything about it" at that stage. The next 
day however, B began to feel something like a light pinprick 
on his leg. Although B's leg felt like it was someone 
elses, it gave him an indication that the "life was coming 
back" into it. This suggests that prior to B's return 
of movement and sensation, he experienced a loss of "life" 
of some sort, i.e. that his body 'died.' Yet it also "c,ame 
back," albeit in different form. B therefore experienced 
a type of rebirth or resurrection, which is evidenced by 
the fact that he continually refers to the "life coming 
back." From that moment onward B experienced a slow buL-
consistent return of movement and feeling in all his 
extremities. This gave B strength and incentive to stay 
positive. It also enabled him to entertain realistic 
thoughts of walking again and to trust and believe in 
himself, as the return of feeling and movement provided 
him with a concrete physiological basis for disbelieving 
the initial verdict of the doctor. The three week mark 
was also a turning point for B. It was after three weeks 
that B first urinated on his own, i.e. he urinated without 
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the aid or impediment of a catheter. This act enabled 
B to feel like he was "winning"', i.e. that he could "do 
it" all, because he had control of everything, which was 
"beautiful." An interesting adjunct to this view is B's 
recounting of a recurrent memory of a time when-h~ was 
_seven years old and lost his "playing gun." B found his 
"playing gun" after three weeks. From a psychoanalytic 
perspective, it is not implausible that the "playing gun" 
is a symbolic representation of B's penis. Remember that 
this is a 'playing gun', i.e. not a real one which B "lost" 
and that he "found" it after three weeks. The fact that 
B's father features in this memory/scenario, adds weight 
to the interpretation that the memory is linked to B's _ 
SCI experience, as B's father himself sustained a spinal 
cord injury at one time. Although this interpretation 
seems closer to dream analysis than phenomenology, it should 
be remembered that SCI patients spend a substantial amount 
of time under the influence of powerful psycho-active 
medications during the acute phase, i.e. medications which 
produce or induce 'dream like states.' For this reason, 
(and for the one which follows), the aforementioned 
interpretation should be found to be plausible. As the 
three week mark was the time at which B 
discovered/rediscovered the possibilities of genital 
sexuality as well as the possibility of full bladder control 
and walking, it represents a critical developmental juncture 
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for him. This period was also the time at which B regained 
more feeling and movement -in hi~ wrist and hands, which 
is a necessary prerequisite for performing crucial tasks 
like feeding oneself, masturbating and urinating. 
Pain was another aspect of B's experience which-was closely 
_related to his altered physiological state. What is 
significant about B's pain is it's intensity and type. 
It is known that patients with incomplete SCI often 
experience pain and altered sensations of a heightened 
and hypersensitive nature as a result of physiological 
compression of the spinal cord (Zejdlik, 1992). B's pain 
at being turned was so severe that it felt as if wild 
animals were trying to pull his arms off. This suggests 
that B's pain was not only atypical but so intense as to 
warrant special turning attention. The way B's visitors 
viewed and treated him was also a significant aspect of 
his experience. These people often asked B intrusive and 
ignorant questions about his body which were degrading 
for him and made him feel as if he were being made fun 
of. When B's visitors cried, it also upset him and made 
him feel negative. In addition, the professor and students 
that were brought in to examine B made him feel like he 
was an object of curiosity, a freak of sorts and it angered 
him. B's psychological reactions to the trauma were 
therefore significantly and adversely affected by something 
other than the trauma itself, i.e. by the insensitive 
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actions and remarks of some of his visitors and by some 
members of the hospital staff •. B also often referred to 
some of his non-feeling or altered body parts as stupid. 
This suggests that B's body had become an object of ridicule 
for him and also a barrier/burden standing in the~way of 
recovery. The fact that B felt like he had nothing to 
do after lunch except count the holes in the roof also 
suggests that he suffered from boredom, although he does 
say that some of this time was spent working on his weak 
points. The latter fact suggests that B was an active, 
concerned patient who took some responsibility for his 
own recovery by continually seeking to gain more movement 
and control. The fact that B's father had a spinal cord 
injury, combined with B's initial belief that it could 
never happen to him, indicates that SCI was either a 
submerged or known, yet unthematized possibility for B 
prior to his accident. B also continually refers to how 
he was prior to the accident. He was an active man doing 
heavy subcontracting work as well as firefighting and other 
physically demanding tasks. It is precisely against this 
background or horizon that B's experience takes on the 
particular significance or dimension that it does. B also 
described his experience with SCI as largely positive, 
as it tought him numerous things, for instance to trust 
and believe in himself. Also, B realized through his 
experience that SCI can happen to anyone and that these 
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things can be avoided if people think more about them. 
Thus B's experience contr~buted' to the enhancement of his 
awareness and perspective. B began to view himself and 
others as equally mortal, i.e. fallible and therefore 
vulnerable to death and the forces of chance and-ct~cident. 
Prior to B's accident, he was unaware of the significance 
of this fact. This interpretation is reinforced by the 
fact that B ponders the question of what he would have 
done if he knew at age seven that he would sustain a spinal 
injury at the age of thirty three. The implication here 
i~ that B would possibly have done different things with 
his life. This is due to B's new perspective on things, 
i.e. a perspective which he attributed to his experience 
with the trauma. 
4.2.3 Summary. Subject C 
Initially, C was told that he would never walk again. 
At first C couldn't "connect" with this idea and demande.d 
a second opinion. He was told that the cord was so damaged 
that the first opinion was correct. This was reinforced 
physiologically by the fact that C had no feeling below 
the level of the L1 vertebra. Following the accident, 
C experienced extended, "excruciating, constant and drastic 
pain" i.e. pain of such intensity that he says it qualified 
him to have a baby. He also experienced paranoid delusions 
and hallucinations as well as "running" thoughts which 
he could neither switch off nor control. Whatever he 
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thought about was "exposed" speedily, one fact after another 
in rapid uncontrollable succession. This C described as 
"a total sense of no control" and "pure fear of being that 
out of control." C also stated that he couldn't recall 
some things about the early stages and that he wOlild 
sometimes "shift" from "lucid to loopy." He recalls some 
hallucinatory experiences, describing an episode in which 
he told a nurse that he "could be making a fortune as a 
comedian." C also stated that he was an up and coming 
patient who "organized" and "ran" the hospital. To 
emphasize this point, C cites examples of how he held 
business meetings at his bedside and took responsibility 
for his own medication. He also described how he succe~ded 
in persuading the turning team to allow him to count for 
himself during the turning process. C discussed the usually 
rigid procedures that SCI patients are forced to comply 
with on the basis of their merits and dealt with the 
hospital staff on an individual/individual, as opposed 
to patient/staff basis. Regarding the turning procedure, 
C described it at one point as "highly unrelaxing" as the 
team would say "relax"and then count loudly. C used the 
threat of "I'll scream" as a means for getting the staff 
to listen to him on a number of occasions. Regarding C's 
relationship with the other patients, he found it hard 
to relate to many of them as they were mostly racist. 
C found it hard to believe that these people would exhibit 
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their racism to black nurses who "had them absolutely 
helpless." C also described himself as "physically the 
luckiest guy in the ward almost all of the time," which 
served to set him apart from most of the other patients. 
C also recieved a lot of support from his parents and says 
that he built his relationship with them while in the 
hospital. C attributes this experience to the fact that 
they were able to spend time together and that "when things 
are so intense, you either deal with what's going down, 
or you bury it." C also described his parents as "amazing 
people" who "learn from their kids." He also described 
his initial experience with SCI as being similar to his 
experience as an activist in detention. During both 
experiences C felt that" someone else was in control,," 
i.e. that C felt a "complete lack of control." He didn't 
decide when to sleep, whether to eat, who came to see him 
or when he would get out. C also emphasised important 
differences between the two experiences, the main one being 
that there wasn't any malevolent force keeping him in the 
hospital. C also recalled a humorous incident told by 
another patient which he regarded as one means for dealing 
with the crisis of SCI. Regarding sex, C stated that 
initially, due to the pain and the drugs, that he didn't 
actually "connect" with the "idea of sex." Only after 
they changed CIS catheter did he realize "that if they 
did this to me and I had feeling there, there would be 
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a problem." C describes this as "quite a freakout." C 
also described how someone from the neurology department 
gave a lecture on sex, which was extremely well presented. 
He also recalls however, that the female patients were 
not given this lecture. Furthermore, C stated ~hat he 
experienced "severe anxiety" related to his "fear of pain" 
prior to his second operation. He also described how at 
one time he had a subconscious fantasy that he "was very 
sick and would become completely well" and that if anyone 
had asked him about it~ that he would have denied it. 
~ also says that during the early s~age, walking was an 
issue for him, but "not now," i.e. two and a half years 
later. C also stated that he "redid" his "entire childhood" 
as a result of SCI, i.e. that he had to "learn to roll 
over," that he was "fed via a nose tube," that he was 
dressed and bathed, that he had to learn to crawl and to 
feed himself. In short, that he did "a rewind of" his 
"whole life." C also described another aspect of his 
experience which refers to his current, i.e. two and a 
half years after the event view of things. C feels that 
SCI patients need to corne to terms with the fact that they 
are now "part of an oppressed group" who are discriminated 
against. He stated that we need to move away from "the 
individual tragedy model" and corne to terms with our "fear 
and horror" of being disabled. In C's view, the disabled 
group are part of an oppressed minority who need to see 
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their situation within it's appropriate political context. 
C feels that this is a neccessary prerequisite for 
emotional, social and individual growth, and that people 
who fail to confront this dimension will remain "stunted." 
4.2.3.1 What does the interview reveal about the meaning 
of the experience for Subject C? 
Initially, C responded with disbelief to the news that 
he would never walk again, as he couldn't "connect" with 
the idea. In addition, C explicitly stated that he was 
in denial at one point as he believed that he was very 
sick but would get completely well •. This suggests that 
C couldn't or didn't want to believe that his disability 
was permanent during the earliest stages, and also that 
denial can assume both covert and overt forms. C-also 
spoke of experiencing intense, excruciating, constant and 
drastic pain as a result of the trauma. This pain was 
so inexplicably intense and unremitting, that C felt as 
if it qualified him to have a baby. This suggests that 
the type of pain experienced by C was greater than the 
single word 'pain' is capable of describing. As Nietzsche 
(1878) has said, "the idea of pain is not the same as the 
suffering of it" (Nietzsche, 1878, p. 61), especially when 
the pain is constant and compression related, as was the 
case with subject C. C also experienced hallucinations 
and delusions of a paranoid type, which he attributed to 
the effects of pethadene. These reactions were accompanied 
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by rapid and running thoughts which exposed ideas and facts 
to C which he could neither switch off nor control. C 
-fel t fear as' a resul t of this <",total sense of no cont'rol" 
and stated that he has difficulty recollecting some things 
from the early stages of the experience. C also spoke 
of numerous incidences where he exerted his autonomy and 
independence. Examples of this included holding business 
meetings at his bedside, i.e. an AGM meeting, taking 
responsibility for his own medication and counting for 
the turning team during the turning process. This suggests 
that C was an active, alert and non-submissive patient 
who took a large measure of responsibility for his own 
rehabilitation. C questioned procedures which he found 
unneccessary and illogical and succeeded in getting the 
staff to treat him as an individual as opposed to a patient. 
Although C threatened to scream on some occasions if he 
didn't get his way, this behaviour can hardly be considered 
abnormal, given the fact that C had little if any other 
means of physically exerting control over his destiny. 
C utilized whatever means at his disposal, be it reason 
or threats of damage to people's eardrums to drive horne 
the point that he was neither passive nor helpless. As 
C was both non-racist and to use his words "physically, 
the luckiest guy in the ward", he felt that it was not 
easy to relate to most of the other patients. C also made 
positive use of his time in bed to build his relationship 
with his parents and to deal with~ instead of bury what 
was happening to him. This suggests that denial was not 
a static state or mood for C, but rather one part of the 
fluid process of dealing with the trauma. C also made 
comparisons between his SCI experience and his ~xperience 
as a political activist in detention. This suggests that 
for C, the experience of being an individual with SCI in 
the hospital was in some way similar to the experience 
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of being in prison, i.e. because in both places someone 
else is in control. In both places C experienced sensory 
d€privation, in addition to others deciding when he slept, 
when he could have visitors, if he ate and when he got 
out. This suggests that being in the hospital for C was 
a form of torture, albeit a form of torture without 
specifically malevolent intent. The fact that an inability 
to move and/or to move out is characteristic of both 
experiences adds weight to the aforementioned assertion. 
C's experience also suggests that humour is one way of 
coping with SCI. This is evidenced by C's own 
pronouncements on the issue as well as his recollection 
of humourous incidents relayed by other patients. According 
to C, sex only became an issue for him following the acute 
phase of the trauma. The fact that C realized that there 
would have been a problem if he had "had feeling" in his 
genitals when they changed his catheter however, suggests 
that genital sexual functioning was a submerged, if not 
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conscious concern for C, even at an early stage. As Wilhelm 
Reich (1948) has pointed out, there is often an 
"anti-thetical functional identity/unity" between the 
"defense and the repressed" (Reich, 1948, p. 102). As 
the repressed (problem), shows itself by the appe~rance 
of it's opposite, i.e. the defense, it seems possible that 
the problem for C was precisely that of 'not having feeliDg' 
and not its opposite, i.e. having feeling, which was a 
problem which C regarded as "quite a freakout." C also 
described feeling severe anxiety prior t~his second 
operation, which he related to his £earof pain. This 
anxiety had a concrete basis in CIS lived experience, as 
he stated that he saw another patient with his "eyes popping 
out of his head with pain" following a fusion. Calso 
stated that he was in denial at one stage, as he had had 
a "subconscious fantasy" that he "was very sick" but would 
become "completely well." C also described how he did 
a "rewind" of his entire life, i.e. he went back to, and 
through his "entire childhood," which suggests that he 
was aware of experiencing some form of regression. C stated 
that he was fed through a nose tube, that he relearned 
to feed himself, to crawl, to dress and to bathe, all of 
which are unmistakeable signs of regression and 
psycho-social redevelopment. C also makes reference to 
an aspect of his SCI experience which is not specifically 
related to the dynamics of the acute phase. At this stage 
in CiS life, i.e. two and a half years after the event, 
he is more concerned with the problems related to being 
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a member of- an opressed group in present day South Africa 
and to the resolution of this problem. This problem 
however, is not the subject of the present thes~s~ important 
as it is to our contextual understanding of CiS experience 
with the trauma as a whole. 
4.3 Reading across experiences for the purpose of 
identifying themes, patterns, directions and flows in the 
material 
After reading 'across' interviews it becomes clear that 
all of the subjects experienced a number of shared and 
individual reactions which may be grouped into themes or 
categories, according to their incidence and type. The 
first group of reactions/themes are those common reactions 
which all of the subjects experienced at one time or 
another. In the second category I have placed those ge~~ral 
themes and reactions which only two of the subjects 
experienced at any given time. In the third group I have 
placed those idiosyncratic reactions and themes which were 
of significance only for the individuals' concerned. 
4.3.1 Shared reactions 
One reaction common to all the subjects experiences was 
disbelief, which was in all cases the first response to 
the trauma. Both subject A and subject B explicitly stated 
that they couldn't believe what had happened, and subject 
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C stated that he couldn't connect with the idea, i.e. he 
couldn't associate it with himself and hence 'believe' 
it. In addition to disbelief~·the reaction of denial 
appears in all three cases, albeit in highly individual 
form. A explicitly expresses a desire to walk, despite 
-" -
the completeness of her lesion and her inability to feel 
or move her legs. This suggests a form of denial, as A 
had no concrete physiological basis for believing that 
she would walk again. B's experience of denial is also 
evident, though less clearcut. As B eventually did walk 
out of the hospital, i.e. he walked-out Hon his own two 
feet," it cannot be said that he was in denial when he 
stated that he would walk. B's lesion was incomplete, 
which meant that he would have some functional returh: 
B nevertheless experienced a form of denial when he made 
reference to the fact that sometimes people would make 
him feel like there was something "wrong" with him. This 
implies that B, at one point wanted or needed to believe 
that there was nothing "wrong" with him, despite the fact 
of the all consuming reality of SCI. It seems implausible 
to say that B was in a stage or enduring 'state of denial' 
however, as he also speaks of the injury in terms of 
acceptance, i.e. he refers to the fact that nothing c~n 
be done about it, thereby implicitly acknowledging what 
has occured. Subject C explicitly states that he was in 
denial, i.e. that at one time he had "a subconscious 
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fantasy" that he "was very sick but would become completely 
well" and that if anyone had asked him if that was what 
he believed, he would have denied it. The experiences 
of all three subjects, however, suggest that the construct 
of 'denial' is much more complex than is usually supposed. 
For instance, if denial is capable of assuming radically 
different forms and meanings, i.e. both covert .and overt, 
depending on the way in which it manifests itself in each 
individual case, then would it be accurate, to simply say 
that all of the subjects experienced denial? This hardly 
seems to adequately encompass what the various subjects 
were experiencing, especially when one considers the fact 
that the word 'denial', may easily be replaced with the 
term 'hope', i.e. a much less psychologically 'loaded' 
term, without negating the essential content of what was 
experienced, at least in the cases of subjects Band C. 
What is possibly true of denial then, may also be true 
of Pain, i.e. another theme which all three of the subjects 
experienced. As the intensity and particular type of pain 
tended to differ across cases, for instance, subject A'S 
pain was "terrible" yet appeared to be related to the 
swelling from the gunshot wound in her back, while subject 
B's pain was of a momentary and hypersensitive type in 
which sensation was altered radically to render a touch 
into a pinch, or a pinch into a tickle, depending on where 
the touching took place, while subject C's pain was so 
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constant, unremitting, excruciating and drastic, as to 
suggest pain of an almost inexplicably hypersensitive, 
heightened and intense type, that it seems impossible to 
group the three types of pain together, under a single 
heading, without destroying the unique meaning pnQ essential 
content of what was experienced as pain, in each individual 
case. 
In addition to the reactions mentioned above, all of the 
subjects experienced a loss of control as a result of the 
trauma. This loss of control was primarily physical, in 
-the cases of subjects A and B and both physical and mental 
for Subject C. The next group of ~eactions and themes 
to be discussed are those which were experienced by at 
least two of the subjects, but not all three. 
4.3.2 General reactions/themes 
In this category are to be found the reactions of anxiety, 
fear, depression/mourning, confusion, anger and re9ress~9n, 
as well as the themes of return, acceptance and 
independence. Both subject A and subject C experienced 
anxiety and fear, which were related to individually 
specific concerns. A's fear and anxiety seems to be of 
a fundamental, i.e. existential type, as it appears 
contiguously with the reaction of loneliness as well as 
the specific fear of death. CiS fear and anxiety appeared 
shortly after the advent of the trauma and seemed related 
to the initial threat posed by his total lack of control, 
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both physically and mentally. CiS anxiety and fear also 
resurfaced just prior to his second operation, at which 
time he feared pain as a resu1t of an impending vertebral 
fusion. Although subject B does not explicitly state that 
he experienced anxiety at any point, the fact that he 
experienced difficulty with urination and with "everything 1l 
in the genital area, i.e. including genital sexual 
functioning, combined with the lack of feeling in his hands 
and his initial uncertainty about walking, suggests that 
anxiety may have been a hidden/submerged aspect of B's 
experience as well. For this reason, anxiety may be placed 
in the category of common reactions mentioned in 4.3.1. 
Depression/mourning were two related reactions which both 
A and B appear to have experienced, but which C makes no 
specific mention of. This is possibly due to CiS 
realization that he was physically the luckiest patient 
in the ward, and to the fact that he was motivated by this 
realization to take a large measure of responsibility for 
his own rehabilitation. A explicitly stated that she was 
very depressed and that she often cries when she thinks 
of what has happened to her. Her depression therefore 
appears to be of a severe and enduring type, which suggests 
the atypical grief reaction, i.e. depressive illness. 
B also stated that he felt down and negative, but attributed 
this negativity largely to himself. On numerous occasions 
however, B's negativity appears to have been triggered 
by the insensitive actions of his visitors and by some 
of the hosp~tal staff. A-was also adversely affected by 
the insensitive and prying questions of some of her 
visitors, including, possibly the interview with this 
researcher. 
_Regression was another theme forming a part of both Band 
CiS experience, but not explicitly A'S. C stated that 
he did a rewind of his entire life and childhood, i.e. 
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that he had to learn to crawl, rollover, and bathe himself, 
all of which presuppose the existence of regression. 
Although B does not explicitly state that he experienced 
regression, the fact that he too had to be fed and bathed 
initially as a result of the loss of function and feeling 
in his hands, in addition to his loss and return of bowel 
and bladder control, suggests that he also needed to 
progress through a series of developmental tasks in order 
to regain control of these important functions. 
Acceptance of the new reality situation was another theme 
experienced by both Band C, but not A. Although it is 
hard to pinpoint precisely when not being able to walk 
ceased to be a problem for C, the fact that he was an active 
patient who exhibited initiative on numerous occasions 
suggests that he accepted his disability enough to integrate 
it into his ego and perform tasks like holding business 
meetings at his bedside. B acknowledged his injury by 
telling himself and others that it happened to him and 
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that nothing can be done about that fact, which suggests 
that he was able to accept the disability and move on from 
.~ . 
it, i.e. move towards recovery. Another theme which 
appeared in the experiences of both Band C was that of 
-
independence, i.e. the ability to exert control over one's 
own destiny. Independent activity is clearly visible in 
the experiences of both Band C as evidenced by CiS 
initiative regarding the turning procedure, his taking 
responsibility for his own medication and his ability to 
halt some discomforting~ yet routine hospital procedures. 
BOexerted his independence by making his true feelings 
known to his visitors concerning the effects/affects of 
some of their insensitive actions upon him, and also ~Y -
his reliance, trust and belief in himself concerning his 
ability to walk and regain bladder control. 
4.3.3 Idiosyncratic themes/reactions 
Loneliness and the specific fear of death are two reactions 
which only A appears to have experienced. A also shows 
signs of Post-Traumatic stress Syndrome, which is a striking 
idiosyncratic feature notably absent from the experiences 
of both Band C. B also experienced a number of reactions 
which were unique to his experience alone. The most 
outstanding of these was the phenomenon of return, which 
he experienced throughout his hospital stay. Although 
C also experienced a certain amount of return, his was 
less striking than B's and therefore of a different quality. 
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B's incremental return of feeling and movement in all his 
extremities enabled him to stay. positive and believe that 
he would walk again. The fact that he literally got 
stronger everyday added weight to B's belief in himself 
and provided him with the impetus to work harde~.on his 
weak points. B also degraded certain parts of his body 
by constantly referring to them as stupid. This shows 
how closely B's recovery was linked to his physical return 
and to his new image of himself. When B was exposed to 
examination he felt like he was being treated like an object 
and therefore began to view himself-as such. By referring 
to the non-working parts of his body as stupid, B projected 
his anger onto his body, thereby revealing that he had 
partially separated himself from it. This implies a divorce 
of the mind-body entity, related to B's new body image, 
i.e. an aspect of the trauma which was a source of 
frustration for him. B also experienced helplessness 
initially as a result of the trauma. This is evident by 
his statements that he couldn't do anything as a result 
of the initial loss of feeling and movement in his body, 
from the neck downwards. This helpless feeling was not 
enduring however, as B eventually regained movement and 
feeling in all his extremities which enabled him to trust 
and believe in himself and in his ability to walk again. 
C also exhibited anger when he did not get his own way, 
yet C's anger appeared to be of a more calculated than 
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spontaneous type, i.e. C used the threat of shouting as 
a mechanism for controlling the'hospital staff. Anotper 
unique feature of B's experience was the enhancement of 
perspective which he attributed to his experience with 
the trauma. B explicitly stated that he realiz~d his own, 
and others' mortality, fallibility and vulnerability while 
in the hospital and that events like SCI, though sometimes 
avoidable can happen to anyone. B thus realized the power 
of chance and accident as a result of his experience with 
the trauma, i.e. an experience which enhan6ed his 
perspective on things and which also possibly enabled him 
to view his accident in a (mostly) positive light. This 
provides some support for the argument that critical life 
experiences are mechanisms of psychological growth for 
some individuals and that SCI is possibly one such 
experience. C also experienced unique occurences which 
A and B did not, for instance constant pain, paranoid 
delusions and hallucinations, running lucid thoughts, the 
building of relationships, feelings similar to imprisonment, 
in addition to incidents of a light and humorous nature, 
which suggest that CIS experience was highly complex, 
largely idiosyncratic and significantly influenced by social 
factors, such as the hospital staff, his parents, his 
previous history, political perspective and pretraumatic 
personality. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The final level of interpretation involves the writing 
of a general nomothetic narrative account of th~~acute 
phase of TSCI which reflects both the researchers and the 
participants understandings of the phenomenon, situated 
in appropriate cultural and social context. The findings 
will be discussed in relation to the existing literature 
and evaluated on the basis of the goals of the study. 
D~fficulties encountered during the-interviewing process 
and reflections on the theoretical and practical 
implications of the study will also be structured into 
this section. 
5.2 Level Three: Discussing The Findings 
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Perhaps the most striking feature of the present study 
was the similarity between the common and general themes __ 
identified in sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 and some of the 
stages and phenomena discussed in chapter two. All of 
the subjects experienced pain, disbelief and some form 
of denial, while at least two of the subjects experienced 
anxiety/fear, depression/mourning, regression and acceptance 
of the disability during the acute phase. These reactions 
did not however, appear in any specific sequence and with 
the possible exception of the overlapping reactions of 
depression and denial in the case of Subject A, did not 
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assume the character of stages or even relatively enduring 
mood states. With the exc~ptio:h of the common ini tia.l 
reaction of disbelief, there appeared to be significant 
overlap between the various reactions and themes, in 
addition to subtle nuances and differences withlD them. 
Take, as an example the shared theme of anxiety, i.e. one 
reaction which all of the subjects experienced. Subject 
A's anxiety seems to be of a fundamental, i.e. existential 
type, as it appeared contiguously with the reaction of 
loneliness as well as the specific fear of death. Subject 
C'also experienced anxiety, yet his was of a more 
temporary/situational type which, initially, was related 
to the total lack of control he experienced both physically 
and mentally as a result of the conjunction of spinal shock, 
the loss of feeling and mobility in his limbs, Morphine 
and the effects of 'running thoughts' which he could not 
control. CIS anxiety again resurfaced just prior to his-' 
second operation, at which time he feared pain as a result 
of an impending vertebral fusion. Although Subject B did 
not label his 'worry' as anxiety, the fact that he 
experienced 'difficulty' with the idea of not being able 
to walk again, as well as with bowel and bladder control, 
in addition to the problem of not being able to feel or 
use his hands, suggests that anxiety may have formed a 
part of B's experience as well. This finding is consistent 
with Siller's (1969) study which identified anxiety as 
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one of the foremost reactions to ~hysical traumatization. 
As can be seen from the examples provided above however, 
-:, . 
there were subtle nuances and variations in the way in 
which anxiety was experienced across cases. 
Depression and/or Mourning were two other relatecl~eactions 
which appeared only in the experiences of subjects A and 
B, but not, apparently in C. As B's experience of 
'negativity' was fleeting and also 'contaminated' by other 
reactions such as anger, boredom and even positivity, it 
seems implausible to say that he experienced depression. 
He did however show signs of grief, -as he stated that he 
would feel down and negative sometimes. Subject A, on 
the other hand experienced such severe depression that 
it manifestly impeded her ability to both cope with and 
accept the trauma. This finding is in direct opposition 
to the stage theory view, which holds that depression is 
the most important stage in the adjustment process and 
also a prerequisite for healthy adaptation. As the only 
individual who was unable to accept the disability during 
the acute care phase was also the only subject who 
experienced severe depression, i.e. subject A, the stage 
theory view that depression is a necessary prerequisite 
for acceptance appears to be innacurate. This finding 
is consistent with the results of Howell, Fullerton, Harvey 
and Klein's (1981) study on depression which found that 
only twenty two percent of their subjects showed signs 
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of diagnosable depression. Furthermore, the finding that 
at least two of the subjects, i.e. subjects Band C 
-:, . 
experienced more than one or two stages/reactions, including 
acceptance of the disability during the acute care phase, 
suggests that Weller and Miller's (1977) assert~G~# that 
during the acute care phase, no more than one or two stages 
may be experienced is innaccurate. What is interesting 
to note, however, is the fact that the only patient who 
did not experience more than two stages was subject A, 
i.e. the only 'complete' patient to participate in the 
study. This suggests that the stage theory model may 
possibly be more applicable to those individuals in the 
category of 'complete' as opposed to 'incomplete' SCI, 
especially when one considers the fact that subject A was 
also the only patient to experience denial and depression 
as relatively enduring mood states, although these reactions 
tended to manifest themselves together, and not in stage~, 
One reaction common to all the subjects experiences was 
disbelief, which was in all cases the first response to 
the trauma. Both subject A and subject B explicitly stated 
that they couldn't believe what had happened, and subject 
C stated that he couldn't connect with the idea, i.e. he 
couldn't associate it with himself and hence 'believe' 
it. This finding is consistent with the view that 
shock/disbelief is the first, i.e. immediate reaction to 
SCI. In addition to disbelief, the reaction of denial 
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also appeared in all three cases, .albeit in highly 
idiosyncratic form. A explicitly expressed a desire to 
., , 
walk, despite the completeness of her lesion and her 
inability to feel or move her legs. This suggests a form 
of denial. B's experience of denial is also ev~dent, though 
less clearcut. As B eventually did walk out of the 
hospital, i.e. he walked out "on his own two feet", it 
cannot be said that he was in denial when he stated that 
he would walk. This raises the important question of what 
constitutes denial in patients with incomplete SCI. As 
Bls lesion was incomplete, he could'expect a certain amount 
of functional return. For this reason, some theorists, 
for instance Caywood (1974) have argued that informatio~ 
about the disability should be given in a way which does 
not destroy the patient's hope that his/her condition may 
improve. As hope may provide the individual with a motive 
to keep working despite the rigours and frustrations of __ 
a treatment program, Caywood (1974) has argued that hope 
is not the same as denial and should therefore not be placed 
in the same category as a defense mechanism. Subject B 
nevertheless did experience a form of denial when he made 
reference to the fact that sometimes people would make 
him feel like there was something "wrong" with him, despite 
the concrete fact of the all consuming reality of SCI. 
It seems implausible to say that B was in a stage or 
(enduring) 'state of denial' however, as he also speaks 
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of the injury in terms of acceptance, i.e. he refers to 
the fact that nothing can be dane about it, thereby 
implicitly acknowledging what has occured. Subject C 
explicitly stated that he was in denial, i.e. that at one 
time he had "a subconscious fantasyll that he was-very sick 
but would become "completely weli ll and that if anyone had 
asked him if that was what he believed, he would have denied 
it. This provides some support for the theory that denial 
is a common response to SCI, but not for the view that 
denial is either a specific stage, or a uniform reaction, 
as it is capable of manifesting itself in so many different 
ways, and is sometimes indistinguishable from other less 
negative reactions, such as 'hope.' 
Pain was another theme permeating all three subjects 
experiences, although the intensity and particular type 
of pain tended to differ from subject to subject. Subject 
A's pain for instance was "terrible ll and appeared to be --
related to the swelling from the gunshot wound in her back. 
Subject B's pain was of a momentary and hypersensitive 
type in which sensation was altered radically to render 
a touch into a pinch, or a pinch into a tickle, depending 
on where the touching took place, while subject C's pain 
was so constant, unremitting, excruciating and drastic, 
as to suggest pain of an almost inexplicably hypersensitive, 
heightened and intense type. Just from these few 
descriptions it should be clear that the single word 'pain' 
-"---.:.-.:.:~::- -:::-:-:.: ' 
-~-'---"-'.~. :..---. 
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does not adequately encompass what these patients 
experienced as a result of the ~rauma. Other words such 
as 'altered;' 'terrible,' 'drastic,' 'unremitting' and 
'intense' are required to show precisely what type of pain 
was experienced and how it manifested itself in_eqch case. 
This is one advantage offered by the hermeneutic approach, 
i.e. that it allows the phenomenon to show itself from 
itself, as described and experienced, rather than as 
constructed or categorized. This finding is of therapeutic 
value and has rehabilitative relevance for the following 
reason. As the turning procedure is potentially painful 
for some patients, it is also a source of anxiety for them. 
Subject B for instance, described one turning episode 
as so painful that he felt like wild animals weretryiI1g 
to pull his arms off. This is an issue which the nursing 
staff and turning team need to become sensitized to, as 
a little sensitivity can go a long way towards minimalizing 
pain and discomfort for someone who is experiencing pain 
of this hypersensitive and intense type. As the turning 
procedure is bound to affect different individuals in 
different ways, depending on the type of pain experienced 
in each case, the type and intensity of pain should be 
carefully evaluated in each patient on a continual basis 
and also used as a guideline for the turning process. 
This procedure would help to minimalize discomfort and 
anxiety related to the turning process, especially in 
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incomplete patients who are experiencing compression related 
pain, such as an individual who· experiences a light touch 
as a 'hammer blow,' for instance. 
In addition to the aforementioned findings, the study also 
provided some support for the assumption that the ~ord 
injured individual experiences a natural regression as 
a result of the trauma. 
Regression appeared in both Band CIS experience, but not 
explicitly in A's. C stated that he did a rewind of his 
entire life and childhood, which is an unmistakeable sign 
of regression. Although B does not explicitly state that 
he experienced regression, the fact that he had to be fed 
initially as a result of the loss of function and feeli~g 
in his hands, as well as the fact of him having to regain 
bowel and bladder control, suggests that he too regressed 
and progressed through a series of developmental tasks 
similar to those described by Pepper (1977) in CHAPTER 
TWO. The themes of (1) Trust versus Mistrust and (2) 
Autonomy versus Doubt were particularly pervasive in the 
experience of Subject B, who confronted and overcame these 
crises almost exactly as Pepper (1977) predicted. The 
findings of the present study complemented Pepper's model 
by identifying the period of intermittent catheterization, 
i.e. the three week mark as an important/critical 
developmental period, for both subjects' Band C, as it 
was during this period that subject B regained bladder 
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control, which had the effect of making him believe that 
he could do everything, i.e. that he now had control.of 
vital functions which he initially lost and was unsure 
of regaining. The three week mark was also the time at 
which the ability/inability to perform sexuallyrbecame 
a concern for subject C, as he realized that it would have 
been problematic for him, if he had had feeling in his 
genitals, when they changed his catheter. The absence 
of regression in the relayed experience of subject A may 
have been mediated by unexplored contextual factors, or 
by the poor quality of the research relationship, i.e. 
by the absence of good rapport and consequently a lack 
of exchange of information about sensitive or intimate 
issues, such as sexual functioning and psycho-social 
redevelopment. 
Anger was another reaction/theme permeating the experiences 
of both Band C, but not manifestly A. Subject B exhibLted 
anger when he was exposed to examination, at which time 
he felt like he was being treated as an object. He also 
expressed anger when he was asked to perform impossible 
physical tasks by his brother, who, B felt, treated his 
disability like a joke. Thus B's anger (and negativity) 
was sometimes trigerred by the insensitive actions of 
others, which suggests that the family of spinal cord 
patients and other visitors, be informed of the possible 
adverse effects which could result from the asking of 
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intrusive questions about the patient's physical 
abilities/inabilities. Spinal ~ord patients are painfully 
aware of their disabilities, in the most literal sense 
of the word and therefore do not need to be reminded of 
them at every turn by individuals who are simpl¥ eurious, 
or ignorant of this fact. 
In addition to the aforementioned reactions and themes, 
the study also identified a number of other phenomena, 
some of which were unaccounted for by the more traditional 
approaches. These included the (incomplete) phenomenon 
of return, in addition to the themes of imprisonment, 
independence, the enhancement of perspective, and 
Post-Traumatic stress Syndrome. Each of these will now 
be discussed in turn, beginnining with the theme of 
imprisonment. 
The theme of imprisonment was one aspect of the SCI 
experience which is of significance if we wish to under~tand 
the meaning of the experience for subject C. C stated 
that he was struck initially by the inherent similarities 
between his SCI experience and his experience of being 
an activist in detention. In both places C experienced 
a loss of control, in addition to others deciding when 
he slept, if he ate, and to a certain extent, when he got 
out. This suggests that the SCI experience contains aspects 
reminiscent of imprisonment, which is of possible 
significance for our understanding of how some patients 
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may psychologically structure the experience, and interpret 
the interpersonal dynamics of control inherent in the 
institutional culture of the unit itself, i.e. a culture 
which is inextricably embedded in the South African social 
and cultural context (of control). As some patLents 
experience immense pain and feelings of entrapment as a 
result of the trauma, they may feel tortured by this pain, 
which, in turn may reactivate memories of imprisonment. 
This is one background/contextual issue which the 
rehabilitation staff need to become sensitive to, in order 
to comprehend precisely what some individuals may be 
experiencing as 'patients' in a controlled institutional 
setting. 
The next theme to be discussed is that of independence, 
i.e. the ability to exert control over one's own destiny. 
This was another theme experienced by both Band C, but 
not A. C displayed his independence by taking the 
initiative regarding the turning procedure, i.e. by counting 
for the turning team, by taking responsibility for his 
own medication and also by halting some rigid and 
discomforting routine hospital procedures; while B exerted 
his independence by making his true feelings known to his 
visitors concerning the effects/affects of their actions 
upon him, and also by his reliance, trust and belief in 
himself concerning his ability to walk and urinate without 
the aid/impediment of a catheter. CiS innovation regarding 
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the turning procedure has possible therapeutic implications. 
As the act of CIS counting for himself undoubtedly increased 
-~ . 
his level of autonomy, it is perhaps a procedure which 
the rehabilitation team might utilize in future with other 
individuals who are disturbed by the 'unrelaxed!~ counting 
of the staff, or who are showing signs of passivity, or 
overdependent and/or submissive behaviour. As independence 
from, and not compliance with, externally imposed routines, 
improves problem solving and fosters coping skills, 
Trieschmann (1985) has argued that independent acts should 
be encouraged and not supressed in patients with spinal 
cord injuries. 
The enhancement of perspective, was another idiosyncrat:\,cc 
feature of the SCI experience which appeared in the case 
of only one individual, i.e. subject B. B stated that 
he learnt numerous things as a result of his experience 
with the trauma, which helped him to realize and corne tQ. 
terms with his inherent fallibility, vulnerability and 
mortality. Subject C also showed signs of recognizing 
the growth promoting potential of the trauma by using his 
time in the hospital to build his relationships. This 
provides support for the argument that SCI is a mechanism 
of psychological growth for some individuals and that some 
patients may, as a consequence, view the trauma as positive 
on the whole. This view is consistent with some of the 
individual descriptions of SCI found in Corbett's (1980) 
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book, Options: Spinal cord injury .and the future, in which 
some cord inj ured individuals e.xpress the view (held by 
subject B) that the experience of SCI enhanced their 
perspective on things, by providing certain insights which 
could not have been realized through any other means. 
The next finding to be discussed is the phenomenon of 
return, i.e. a phenomenon which appeared most strikingly 
in the experience of subject B. 
Whereas individuals with complete SCI usually experience 
a sudden and permanent loss of sensation and mobility in 
the region(s) below the level of severance (the example 
of subject A), some incomplete patients (the example of 
subject B) experience a sudden, yet temporary loss of 
feeling and mobility below the point of compression/damage 
accompanied by an incremental process of return, i.e. a 
return of function and feeling in the body, which in itself 
provides the individual with a source of hope and streng_t.h. 
This is one contextual aspect of the trauma which is 
completely absent from the existential horizon of patients 
in the complete category, who must face, with painful and 
deepening awareness, a life of permanent and irreversible 
disability. The type and nature of cord transection is 
therefore one determinant of the physiological and 
psychological adjustment pattern of the cord injured 
patient, as it is this factor which determines more than 
any other, which existential issues the cord injured 
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individual must face as a result of the trauma. Subject 
_B for examp~e, stated that he initially experienced great 
difficulty with the idea of never walking again, i.e. a 
problem which remained a "struggle" for him until his left 
leg "came back." After the return of his left slde however, 
_B felt stronger every day until he knew that he would walk 
again, at which time the problem of not walking gave way 
to the problem of bowel and bladder control and sexual 
functioning. Following B's success at urinating on his 
own, this function als6 ceased to be a problem for him, 
at which time B felt like he had everything under control. 
For subject A however, the problem of not walking persisted. 
She was unable to accept the permanency of her disability 
and she remained depressed. As the process of return did 
not occur in A, she had no concrete physiological source 
from which to proceed with recovery and hence had to either 
face, or repress the issue which B eventually avoided fa6ing 
altogether, i.e. B did not have to face the fact of never 
walking again, whereas A's successful adaptation demanded 
that she come to terms with this particular fact of 
irreversibility, first and foremost, in order to move 
towards adjustment/rehabilitation at all. The psychological 
difference between incomplete and complete SCI then, is, 
in some cases as large as the difference between recovery 
and rehabilitation, i.e. it is a matter of difference in 
degree of possibility, in the strictest, physiological 
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sense of the word, which cannot but profoundly impact on 
the cord injured individuqlls mind. Subject Bls exp~rience 
in particular demonstrates how crucial the phenomenon of 
return was for him, as without it, he may have "struggled" 
much more and possibly not have been able to view-his 
_experience in such a positive light. Subject C was also 
significantly affected by the incompleteness of his lesion, 
as he explicitly stated that he was the luckiest person 
in the ward, physically speaking, which gave him the 
motivation to actively participate in, and take 
responsibility for his own rehabilitation. Thus the extent 
of damage to CiS cord i.e. the incompleteness of his lesion 
proved to be a significant existential baseline factor _ 
for him as well. This finding is important, because it 
suggests that there are good reasons for believing that 
significant differences exist between the psycho-physical 
experiences of patients in the complete and incomplete _-
categories and that, as a consequence, a clearer distinction 
needs to be made in the literature between these two groups 
if we are to further enhance our understanding of the 
idiographic/nomothetic tension inherent in this particular 
type of trauma. This is not to say that there are no 
similarities between the psychological experiences of SCI 
patients in the complete and incomplete groups, for the 
study has clearly demonstrated that there are, but rather, 
that important differences exist which need to be taken 
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into consideration if we are to adequately comprehend the 
complexity and true nature of t'he experience. 
The final idiosyncratic reaction to be discussed is the 
appearence of Post-Traumatic stress syndrome in the 
experience of subject A. Holmes (1991) has stated that 
the major symptom of Post-Traumatic stress Syndrome is 
the reexperiencing of the traumatic event. This is clearly 
evident by subject A's description of what happens to her 
whenever she sees a fight outside or hears a door slam, 
i.e. she thinks of the shooting "and then it happens again." 
This particular aspect of A's experience" may have been 
mediated by unexplored contextual factors, such as her 
pre-traumatic history, and also raises some important 
questions about the type of rehabilitation model appropriate 
for the treatment of spinal cord patients. As 
rehabilitation is the process of learning to live with 
one's disability in one's own environment, Trieschmann, -
(1986) has argued that it is a dynamic process which begins 
at the moment of injury and continues for the remainder 
of the disabled individual's life (Trieschmann, 1986). 
Health care professionals therefore need to understand 
the principles of learning and the multiplicity of factors 
involved in the process of adjustment to disability, in 
order to integrate this understanding into a holistic 
rehabilitation program for spinal cord patients 
(Trieschmann, 1986). Unfortunately, the operational 
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policies and procedures of most hospitals and spinal units 
have been designed to dispense ~nits of organic treatment. 
The individual is viewed as a 'p'atient, and the staff 
delivers treatments, usually according to a schedule and 
sequence which has been designed by the staff for the 
convenience of the staff (Trieschmann, 1986). This is 
essentialy what has become known as the medical model of 
rehabilitation. According to this view, the adjustment 
of the spinal injured person is contingent upon treatments 
dispensed to organic variables such as the skin, the bladder 
and bowels, paralysis, lack of sensation and respiratory 
function, unless hindered by underlying personality problems 
such as lack of motivation, depression, low self-esteem, 
anger, anxiety, frustration and dependency, in which c~se, 
units of treatment are dispensed to these variables in 
the form of counseling and psychotherapy. Trieschmann 
(1986) has argued that this is not an optimal environmen.t 
in which to teach new behaviours to persons who are not 
sick and who are essentially students (Bloch and Basbaum, 
1986, p. 304). In contrast to the medical model is the 
educational/learning model of rehabilitation. According 
to this model, adjustment is a function of the interaction 
of person variables, organic variables and environmental 
variables. Person variables include habits, locus of 
control, method of coping with stress, preferences, rewards, 
self image and creativity. Organic variables include level 
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(and type) of injury, age, medical complications, strength 
-and enduran~e; while envirDnm~~tal variables include 
hospital milieu, stigma value of the disability, family 
and interpersonal support, financial security, cultural 
influences, access to medical care, recreationaf~ahd 
-educational opportunities, architectural barriers and 
transportation (Trieschmann, in Bloch and Basbaum, 1986, 
pp. 304-305). The experience of subject A in particular, 
raises serious questions about the appropriateness of the 
medical model of rehabilitation for the care of spinal 
cord patients, even during the acute care phase. As it 
is crucial to tackle serious impediments to adjustment, 
of whatever nature, as early as possible, it seems 
improbable that the medical model is capable of doing so, 
especially when one considers the fact that the medical 
model only deals with psychological disturbances, once 
they have already significantly exerted themselves, often 
maladaptively, upon the overall course of adjustment. 
With this idea in mind, one may now return to chapter one 
to see if the study succeeded in attaining its goals. 
5.2.1 Evaluating the study 
It should be apparent that the study was successful in 
meeting both it's primary and secondary goals, which were 
the generation of a (complex and meaningful) 
phenomenologically sensitive account of the acute phase 
of TSCI and the articulation of a hermeneutic mode of 
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research. This interpretation is borne out by the study's 
findings, which shed some-light on the impact of the. 
numerous social, subjective, contextual and idiosyncratic 
elements which serve to direct and shape the experience 
of spinal cord trauma for the individual concerned. In 
addition to this, the study identified numerous practical 
problems, such as the pain some patients experienced with 
regard to the turning procedure, and phenomena such as 
the phenomenon of return, which were unnacounted for by 
the more traditional approaches. This provides further 
support/justification for the statement that the study 
met it's goals, as the aforementiorned discoveries and 
elaborations would not have been possible, if the method 
of analysis had been less historiological in character. 
It is also clear from some of the similarities inherent 
in the findings, that both the natural scientific and the 
hermeneutic approach attain crucial scientific knowledge-: 
These two approaches are therefore not in opposition to 
one another, but augmentative and complementary (Du Preez, 
1985). The natural scientific approach has proven to be 
useful for two primary reasons: (1) because it is capable 
of systematizing knowledge through the processing of large 
amounts of information (Du Preez, 1985) and (2) because 
it has been successful in explaining the functions of many 
of the psychological reactions to TSCI, without which, 
we would lack crucial aspects of knowledge about the nature 
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of the experience. The hermeneutic approach is also useful 
-for two main-reasons: (1 )-becapse it is capable of 
effectively exploring the idiographic/nomothetic tension 
inherent in complex human experiences (as the present study 
has shown) and (2) because it assists us to understand 
these experiences in their appropriate contexts, i.e. in 
holistic, meaningful and novel ways, which are of both 
practical and theoretical significance. This said, one 
may now turn to an evaluation of the methodology of 
hermeneutics and thereby to a more critical appraisal of 
the present investigation. 
5.2.2 Evaluating the methodology 
The argument has already been made in chapter three o( 
this thesis that interpretive accounts cannot be evaluated 
on the basis of a traditional validation procedure of the 
type favoured by empirical-analytical science, but may 
instead be evaluated on the basis of the criteria for 
evaluating interpretive accounts (outlined in chapter three, 
section 3.4). As a discussion of these criteria will go 
some way towards answering the question of validity 
regarding the findings of the present study, these criteria 
will now be considered in turn: Regarding the first 
criterion, i.e. that of coherence/plausibility, the study 
has demonstrated that it is both coherent and plausibile, 
as an answer to the problem of the acute phase has been 
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provided in the form of a complex and meaningful 
interpretive account of it, which effectively illuminates 
the idiographic/nomothetic tension inherent in this 
particular type of trauma. Regarding the second criterion, 
i.e. the account's relationship to external evidence, the 
_study should be found to be convincing, as the findings 
are consistent with much of the existing literature on 
the topic. Regarding the last two criteria, i.e. 
agreement/consensus and relationship to future events, 
it should be remembered that agreement is no guarantor 
of correctness, as fUrther material may show an 
interpretation to be false, or future interpretations may 
proceed from incommensurable perspectives. Also, it renfains 
to be seen whether the account is sensible and communicable 
in a manner which allows others to interpret the material 
in a similar light, as the study's relationship to future 
events will be contingent upon how it is viewed, interpreted 
and acted upon by members of the scientific and 
rehabilitative communities. 
The study nevertheless did contain a number of shortcomings 
which I will make brief mention of here. Firstly, regarding 
the interviewing process itself, I experienced difficulty 
both in formulating the question to be asked, and also, 
in remaining focused upon it, once the discussion got under 
way. This problem would perhaps not have existed if I 
had spent more time explaining the purpose of the study 
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to the participants, and also if I had given them more 
time to prepare and reflect on 'their experiences instead 
of just 'jumping' in and asking them to describe everything 
that happened to them. This was particularly the case 
with subject A, who did not disclose her experiences to 
the extent that I would have liked. This was a result 
of the poor quality of the research relationship, and is 
possibly something that could have been avoided if I had 
disclosed more about my own experience and my reasons for 
conducting the study, prior to our interview. The value 
of self disclosure, was aptly demonstrated by the visibly 
deeper level of discussion which I ~njoyed with subjects 
Band C, wi th whom I was able to strike up an immediate·' 
bond. It is therefore likely that my rapport with A was 
adversely affected by the fact that I was a male researcher, 
asking a young female in an extremely vulnerable state 
to tell me about her intimate experiences. This is one-
ethical issue which needs to be considered and acted upon, 
as the type of questions one asks may adversely affect 
the individual concerned as well as the quality of the 
research relationship. In some cases therefore, the 
interviews should perhaps be preceeded by, and followed 
up with, therapeutic discussion sessions (Du Preez, 1985). 
Another difficulty I encountered was with the lack of 
privacy in the ward and with the constant noises and 
interruptions which characterize hospital life. Thus the 
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physical interview context ,itself should be taken into 
consideration when speaking to 'individuals in a hospital, 
or any other, controlled setting. Furthermore, it would 
be interesting to see how the subjects' perspectives of 
the trauma change over time. Subject C's view oT-the acute 
phase, for instance, might have been radically different 
if I had interviewed him immediately following the onset 
of the trauma. Also, it might have proven useful if I 
had gleaned more information about the. subjects' behaviour 
from sources outside of the subjects themielves, i.e. from 
the nurses, doctors, family members and visitors with whom 
the subjects interacted. This may have had the effect 
of contextually 'rounding out' the interpretation in a 
more complete manner. Another shortcoming of the study 
was the lack of a historical perspective regarding the 
subjects' pre-traumatic experiences. This was an unexplored 
contextual/mediating factor which, if included in the 
research design, may have shed some more light on the 
idiosyncratic reactions experienced by the subjects. This 
problem may perhaps be rectified in future by including 
questions in the research design which are aimed 
specifically at gaining insight into the individual's 
pre-traumatic history, i.e. for instance, the asking of 
the question: "can you describe what your life was like 
before the accident?" 
Regarding the interpretive procedure/data analysis, it 
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might have proven useful if I had gone back to the 
respondents for further clarifi~ation on certain issues, 
such as regarding the respective roles played by humour 
and 'running lucid thoughts' for subject C. As the analysis 
was extremely time consuming however, this step wa5 not 
included. It would not, in any event, have 'validated' 
the study in the traditional scientific sense of the word, 
as there will always be a surplus of meaning inherent in 
complex human experiences (Ricouer, 1976), and because 
the respondents' views will always remain open to further 
interpretation. As the subjects' ex~eriences have been 
textually 'fixed' however, the reader is invited and 
encouraged to go back to the original interview narrativ~s 
to explore the additional possibilities for interpretation 
inherent in them. This is one advantage of the hermeneutic 
approach, i.e. that it is able to render dynamic, as opposed 
to static, interpretations of phenomena, in ways which 
facilitate alterations in our understanding of them. 
5.2.3 Suggestions for further research 
Firstly, the finding that significant differences exist 
between the psycho-physical experiences of patients in 
the complete and incomplete categories, suggests that 
further research endeavours be initiated in order to provide 
us with a more concise illumination and understanding of 
the significance of the phenomenon of return, for patients 
in the incomplete category. Secondly, the numerous 
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compensatory mechanisms for dealing with the trauma, such 
as humour, need to be explored and analyzed further, in 
order to enhance our understanding of their function and 
significance for the overall course of psychological 
adjustment. The role played by dreams, for instance, might 
also be investigated in this regard. 
5.3 Concluding Summary 
As explanation is contingent upon discourse, and discourse 
contingent upon language, which is inherently metaphorical, 
scientific inquiry is in need of interpretation. This 
is the case whether we are speaking-of Traumatic Spinal 
Cord Injury or any other complex human experience. As 
interpretive inquiry illuminates the contextual and 
meaningful nature of knowledge, it shows complex human 
phenomena explicitly, sometimes for the very first time. 
This is in essence the main contribution of the hermeneutic 
approach to the field of scientific inquiry, i.e. that 
it allows phenomena to be shown in novel and meaningful 
ways which enhance our understanding of their complexity. 
This is also another contribution of the present study, 
i.e. that it demonstrated, through an analysis of the 
experience of the acute phase of TSCI, that complex human 
phenomena are totalities in themselves, which cannot be 
artificially compartmentalized and meaningfully understood 
at the same time. 
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APPENDIX A I 
I 
Interview Narrative 
Subject A 
A: (in a very soft, shy voice) I was at the community 
hall, and there was a fight outside and I heard shots and 
I ran, and then I felt myself being hit. 
R: And then what happened? 
A: I just felt myself go down and then I felt like an 
electric shock in my back and I couldn't feel my legs and 
then I was on the ground and there was blood, and I realized 
I'd been shot • (A's eyes start to well up with tears 
and her voice becomes almost inaudible at this point), 
I tried to move my legs, but I couldn't. I was all alone, 
I was scared, and then someone called an ambulance -and' ... 
they put me into it. Then they took me to the hospital 
and put pipes in me, here and here, and the pain was 
terrible. I was all alone and then they operated on me. 
R: What was the pain like. Can you tell me? 
A: It hurt where the bullet went in, in my back, and it 
felt swollen there. 
R: Do you remember what you were thinking, before they 
operated on you? 
A: I was scared. I didn't know if I would be able to 
wake up again. I was worried for my life and I was scared. 
R: Can you tell me what happened next. 
A: They brought me to the hospital and stuck all these 
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tubes in me, and they told me that I wasn't going to walk. 
R: And what did you think when. they told you that? 
A: I could~'t believe it. I~~anted to walk. I want to 
. (A begins to cry at this point and I decide to shut 
off the tape recorder. I feel like I am intrud~n~ on her 
and I tell her that I'll understand if she doesn't want 
to talk about it anymore. She is obviously experiencing 
great emotional turmoil and pain). After a few minutes 
A says that it's O.K. if we go on. 
R: Can you tell me how long you were in bed for before 
you got into the chair? 
A: For six weeks. 
R: Can you describe some things that occured to you in 
that time, like what you were feeling or thinking? 
A: I was depressed, very depressed. I would think about 
what happened and I would start to cry, but coming here, 
it helped, it helped me to be with these other people. 
Then I realized that I wasn't the only one. 
R: You mean the other patients? 
A: Yes. 
R: O.K. A? 
A: Yes? 
R: Can you tell me a little bit more about what you did 
while you were lying here? 
A: The teacher would come everyday, and I do schoolwork. 
I'm in standard nine. 
R: Do you do anything else? 
A: I just think, I think a lot. I think about what 
happened. 
R: Do you have visitors? 
A: Yes. 
R: Does it help to have visitors? 
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A: I don't know. Because when they ask me what happened, 
I just start to cry, you know sometimes, when somebody 
slams the door, I think that it's a shot and then it happens 
again, and sometimes when I'm outside and I see somebody 
fighting I think of the shooting, that it's going to happen 
again. 
(A begins to cry again and I feel like we should discontinue 
our discussion. The trauma is obviously very fresh in 
her mind and her pain at being asked these questions is 
obvious. I turn off the recorder and assume a counselling 
role. After talking for a while about people who have 
lived and thrived with spinal cord injuries we are 
interrupted by a nurse who tells A that it's time for her 
to go to physio. Our interview ends at this point). 
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APPENDIX B 
Interview Narrative 
Subject B 
B: Just after the accident, I was lying in the veld, and 
I couldn't feel anything from my neck downwards;~ ~y legs, 
_I tried to lift my legs, and I couldn't do that. I asked 
them, the one person, "where's my left arm?" and she says 
"It's right next to you." But I can't feel anything. 
And then they brought me to the hospital. It was about 
four a clock in the afternoon. They sent me for X-Rays. 
The first time, doctor said no, they can't see properly 
but there is something wrong with my neck. So they took 
me for a scan. Alright, they gave me some injections, 
and I was far away. I can't remember everything properly. 
It was about twelve a clock at night. Dr. De Klerk already 
put on this ring (halo/traction device) on my head. My 
wife was standing next to me and Dr. De Klerk said to her~ 
"sorry, your husband's neck is broken. Never in his life 
will he use his hands or legs." But still I couldn't 
believe it. But I couldn't do anything. This is still 
the first night. I just talked to myself and said I can't 
believe it. I closed my eyes and prayed and honestly I 
wake up the next morning. I was lying there. It was about 
2 0 clock and I feel something. But I can't say where 
it is. I thought like it was somebody else. 
R: You're talking about your legs now? 
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B: Ja. I can't believe that it's my own legs, but the 
life is coming back, after the -doctor told my wife that 
I'll never use my hands again. 
R: And what did you think then after you started feeling? 
B: I thought, I'm mad. It must be somebody else. 
Something is going on but I don't know what. It felt like 
when you touch someone with a needle lightly. Something 
like that. So I was lying there and my wife came to visit 
me. And I told her about this story and she took my leg 
and asked me if I could feel someth~ng, and I said YES. 
You are touching my leg. And then I realized for the first 
time, that the life is coming back, you know, and it was 
~ 
going on like that, the feeling in my right arm, and then 
my right leg started coming back, and my left side, for 
the first three or four weeks, I couldn't feel it, I 
couldn't do anything with it and the right arm was, you 
know, the same story, needles, pins and needles, and then, 
all of a sudden I tried to move my wrist, and it moves. 
O.K. so during that time, I was still praying, and thanking 
the lord for what he'd given back to me, till that stage, 
and one morning I woke up again and bent my toes on my 
right leg, and as I do it on my right leg, I feel on my 
left leg, that there's something going on there as well. 
And then I try harder and harder and harder and realize 
that my left leg is coming back. 
R: And up until then, up until the left leg came back, 
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what did you think about walking. Did you think you would 
-walk again? -
B: That was, I struggled with that. I can't see myself 
walking with only one leg and one arm, but when the left 
leg came back, I thought I will walk, and before that, 
-I just tried to stay positive, and I prayed. I couldn't 
see myself with one arm and one leg, just sitting in a 
chair all day. But when the feeling came back in my leg, 
I could feel, but I couldn't move it, Louise, the physio, 
she helped me. It took time, and everyday I did physio, 
went to the gym. 
R: Oh, so you've been going up there already? Is this 
the second time you've been in traction then? Because. 
- ~-" 
usually you do physio in bed until they remove the ring. 
B: Ja, but this is the second ring, and Louise, the physio, 
took me up with the bed. The first ring, I had an abcess, 
so they had to take it off. 
R: And what was that like? 
B: (Lets out a long whistle). To take it off was painful. 
I'll tell you something my friend. The bone in your head, 
you can feel the screws going in, I was just, I made my 
fist like this, and I was biting my teeth, and I said, 
Doctor, please you're hurting me and I was sweating, you 
won't believe it, and I kept thinking just stay strong, 
stay strong as he screws it in the bone. Really, really 
it was painful. If he comes in now and says he's going 
to put on another one, I won't let him do it. 
R: Did yo~ have pain any other time? 
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B: My neck was painful, when they brought me in. It was 
swollen. Then afterwards, the pain ran down my shoulders 
to the upper arms. Till now, if you press your finger 
on my arm and shoulders it's sore, it's like you're pinching 
me. 
R: And does it last a long time, or just a second or two? 
B: It lasts only for a little bit. In the beginning, 
when they turned me, it was like so~eone was trying to 
pull off my arms, like a wild thing trying to pull you 
apart. And I kept telling them, please, it's very sore. 
So they told the Doctor and he sent me for x-rays_andthey 
found that the ligament in my wrist was torn. And then, 
just before visiting time, after about the fourth week, 
I was in the gym doing exercises, and I feel something 
in my left hand, and I just pick it up like this, and then 
later the Doctor told me that they're gonna do an operation. 
R: What did he say? Are they gonna cut out a piece of 
your hip? 
B: Ja, he said they gonna open my hip, and chip out the 
bone there and stick it in my neck. How did you know? 
R: Well it happened to me. I had the same thing. 
B: Ja? Where was yours? 
R: Mine was C5-C6. You'll lose some feeling in your hip 
because they have to cut through nerves to chip out the 
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bone, but the fusion makes your bone stronger and it will 
protect your' cord. ' . 
B: That's what the doctor said. 
R: B? 
B: Yes? 
R: Can you tell me something more about what you've been 
thinking about while you've been lying here? 
B: On this stage? 
R: Yes. 
R: Well on this stage, R, the first thing is, like this 
morning, they carne to take my measurements for that jacket. 
I was told they gonna put on that jacket and I'm gonna 
sit up straight, for a week or two, maximum, and I'm 
positive, R, I'm sure I'm gonna do it. I will walk, not 
the same as before, for sure, but I will walk and there's 
nothing that's gonna put me back. 
R: Looking back on this experience now B, seven weeks 
afterwards, how has it been? 
B: Well R, I would say that it's been about 90 percent 
positive, and about 10 percent negative, and the ten percent 
negative you can say it's me, myself. Sometimes you get 
down, you know, you feel down, but oh no, when someone's 
trying to fool me, I don't know for what reason they do 
it. You know I'm just lying on my back here, I'm just 
spending time. For what I don't know. At one stage I 
thought they were just using me for the students. 
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R: What do you mean? 
B: I mean there was once a pr0fessor who asked me if I 
minded if he brings in some students, some final year 
students, because he wants them to do examinations, because 
my injury, on the x-ray, you can't believe that this person 
hasn't got more damage. 
R: So you thought that they wanted to keep you here for 
things like that? 
B: Ja well, (laughs). In the beginning I was laughing 
about it, I thought to myself, I thought I was a special 
person, everybody's coming to you, to see this, and see 
this, but later on that feeling starts getting negative, 
and I didn't like it anymore, you know, everybody-asks' 
you questions, they tell you to pick up your leg, they 
ask you hundreds of questions about your body. 
R: And what did that make you feel like? 
B: Like there's something wrong, like they can't believe 
what they see, and I was busy playing with them, like if 
they'd ask me a question, I'd give them the wrong answer. 
That was, later, that I don't like it anymore. That was 
the negative part. 
R: And the positive part? 
B: Believing and trust. I believe in myself, I will walk. 
And what makes me that positive is that I can feel myself 
getting stronger, I can feel more power in my leg. It's 
not someone else telling me, I know it. The only thing 
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I can't do now, is move this wrist. I can feel it, but 
-no movement~ You know, Louise.was telling me one da~, 
now B, she shows me, and she says, now try to do this, 
and I was trying. You know I felt stupid, honestly, like 
I can't understand what she wants, but I know what she 
wants, I just can't do it. But the following day, just 
all of a sudden, I could do it, just like that. You know, 
this hand, you can put something in it and I won't look, 
and you can put it in my hand, and as I close my hand I 
can't tell you what it is. And this leg, my upper leg, 
if you pinch it, pinch it as hard as you can, it's not 
painful, it's like someone's tickling you. One day, I 
was at physio, I'm doing exercises with this leg,-and.cI'11 
just lie there and laugh, you know I feel stupid, but it's 
tickling, and the other leg is normal, and the right leg 
is still stupid. 
R: Can you tell me a bit about what it's like to be here 
at night? I mean what goes on? What do you do? 
B: Well, at two a clock in the morning they wake you up 
and turn you. They turn you every few hours, and then 
at ten o'clock at night they give you your sleeping pills, 
but as I'm lying here, like after lunch, you know what 
can you do? I can't pick up a book properly and read, 
I'm just lying here and I'm going mad from counting all 
these holes in the roof. 
in this block. 
I've counted all these holes 
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R: And what else? 
B: Well, Ifm trying to do something about my weak points 
as well, to exercise them. Like this morning, for the 
first time, I can move this arm in this direction, towards 
you, I couldnft do it before. You know, I canft believe 
that Ifm still winning. Thatfs why I was telling the 
people, give me two weeks, I will stand on my feet and 
I will walk. 
R: Can you tell me, youfve had the catheter in from the 
beginning right? 
B: I have it in for three weeks, then they take it out, 
and they test me, they test if I can do it myself. And 
at that stage it was very difficult. I canft even moye 
my hands properly, I struggled with everything down here 
(gestures to the genital area). I wasnft sure where I 
was watering. I couldnft feel it if it was in the bed, 
or in the bottle, because my hands were stupid. After 
they took it out, it was only two times, in those three 
days, that I was able to get it right to water myself. 
R: And how did that feel? Being able to do it yourself? 
B: Beautiful, like I was winning. I can do it, Ifve got 
control of everything 
R: Can you tell me a bit about your visitors, you know 
the people who come to see you, what is it like for you 
when they come here? 
B: Well, R, you know they ask you a lot of questions. 
""<"'-~.-e:..c: ..... :-_--:--_-c-.-- -
----~--,--.:" .. ~---..... :-,~- ,-
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They can't understand what it's like. You and me, we know 
-what it's like because we've ~~en through it, they haven't. 
They have no idea. They can't understand. Like sometimes, 
they're laughing about stupid things, like my twin brother, 
he's a joke on his own. He tells me, try and touch your 
-left ear with your right hand over your head. stupid things 
like that. You know, a normal person can do it, but, for 
me here, it's impossible, my wrist just falls down, and 
he's laughing, for him it's just a stupid movement. They 
can't understand it's not a joke. 
R: And the nurses and doctors? 
B: No, they are very, very good. I can't for one second 
say that they don't know what's going on. 
R: Can you tell me a little bit more about what you've 
been thinking about while lying here? 
B: I think about a lot of things. Things I want to do 
on the plot, things that I could have done, like building 
(hokke) pens for the animals. And I think about simple 
things. One thing I used to think about a lot was when 
I was seven years old. I lost my gun, my playing gun. 
I was playing outside with it, and my father was there 
and there were stacks of wood. And I hung my revolver 
there, and lost it, and for three weeks, I couldn't find 
my playing gun, and I thought to myself, what would I have 
done then, if I knew, that at a later stage, at the age 
of thirty-three, that I would break my neck. stupid things 
131 
like that. And sometimes I'm thinking about my wife and 
_my kids, my work. I was a subcontractor, doing heavy work. 
-~ , 
You know, my father, he had the same injury as me, also 
C3 and C4, but he had a shooting accident. His left arm, 
he lost nearly 80 percent of its use. But my accIdent 
_was a motor car accident. It was so quick, you can't 
believe it. still now, I can't believe that it happened, 
stupid thing, front wheel burst, I was a passenger, my 
friend was driving, and why he done it I don't know, you 
don't hit the brakes. The bakkie rolled about four times. 
t flew out of his window. I can't believe it. It's a 
stupid thing. The first thing I saw was his legs and he 
hit brakes and I told him, DON'T HIT BRAKES. When I close 
my eyes I still see it. You know, right in the beginning, 
I don't remember much, I was very deurmekaar (confused), 
feeling very stupid. I don't remember it, but the nurses 
told me that when the doctor asked me, "how are you 
feeling?" I said "with my hands" and the sisters, they 
still laugh about it. I can't remember that stage. You 
know another thing, my wife comes everyday, she comes to 
visit me and she tells me about the plot, what's going 
on there, and she sends regards from my sons, and she tells 
me about the plot, and I'll think about something else 
and tomorrow night I'll ask her a question and she'll look 
at me and say, "but I told you about that last night." 
I listen, but small things like that I can't remember, 
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and it bothers mer because my wife, you know, it's, she's 
-a part of me-. Maybe I got- a Q~mp on the head, someti'mes 
I feel stupid. But I think it will go away, I just think 
that. My biggest enemy in life, I wouldn't wish this on 
him. I don't know why it happened to me, but it happened, 
-for what reason I don't know. Maybe I'm wrong, but I never 
thought it would happen to me. I worked in the fire brigade 
for five years. There were lots of car accidents. I used 
to dive off cliffs into the sea. I never got hurt. I 
once fell through the roof of a building when I was a 
fireman and I got up and walked. Now I know that I could 
have broken my neck. I never, never thought it would happen 
to me, but it shows you, it just shows you that it can, 
happen to me, it can happen to you, it can happen to anyone. 
Never say that that or that will never happen to you. 
That's the biggest thing I've learnt out of this story, 
and I've got a big shock out of it. And I thought, can't 
people think about it, because they can avoid it. I learnt 
that you are a person like everybody else, you're not God's 
gift to earth. You are not invincible. You are not a 
piece of machinery or steel that can't break. 
I learnt it here. 
I know, 
You know, the first week, a lot of family came to see me, 
and they can't believe that it happened, that it happened 
to me. When they first came here, they started to cry, 
and it made me negative, like I'm going down, and I don't 
- _,,: -.~ __ '-_,'. r ~ __ 
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like it, so after that I told the family, it happened to 
me, there's "nothing we can do' about it. I'm not dead, 
it's a big thing that happened to me, but don't cry, when 
you see me lying here, because it hurts me inside. 
Subject C 
APPENDIX C 
Interview Nar~ative 
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C: Initially, they told me that I was never going to walk 
again. The first time around, I didn't actually connect 
with this, the second time around, I demanded a second 
opinion and basically, the person I requested to be called 
in for the second opinion said the same thing. The amount 
of trauma and swelling around the spinal cord even though 
it was only damaged, had just blocked all contact. At 
that time, anything below L1 had no feeling and there was 
excruciating pain from the break itself. 
R: And what was that pain like? 
c: Well, I've never had such constant pain, and such 
drastic pain for so long. That qualifies me to have a 
baby, no question about it. I have the distinction of 
being the loudest male they ever had at that place. The 
other thing that was problematic was, that they put me 
on Pethadene. 
R: And what was that like? 
C: The worst trip I've had in my life. Not that I've 
had anything to do with drugs, but it's a very rare side 
effect, and the only person who picked it up was a friend 
of mine who's a very hot shot pharmacist, and a very rare 
side effect is that you get extreme paranoia. 
R: Can you describe it? Can you give me an example? 
'---'-----'- -_- -C-,<-;-- -' ->:-: :'-----:'c-:-;':::':5',:::':';-
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c: The worst was that I, I mean a lot of stuff I don't 
-actually recall myself. The ~9rst though was this sensation 
of running down your brain, running thoughts, in the same 
way as when you're running down a hill and you can't stop, 
you can't switch them off. All I remember was that anything 
-I started to think about, or tried to consider, it exposed 
them, with speed, and it was like this total sense of no 
control. 
R: So these thoughts were not lucid? 
C: No, that was lucid. High speed delivery. It wasn't 
just like you were dwelling on something, it was like, 
one fact two fact three fact, go! go! go! The overwhelming 
impression was fear, pure fear of being that out of confrol. 
Then I'd be like trying to introduce people, and I'd shift 
from lucid to completely loopy, like oh, I can't introduce 
you to these people, because they've turned into a snake, 
or there was this very funny thing, this nurse was workfrig 
nightshift and I checked her little badges and it was very 
odd, I checked one badge and it was a little french loaf 
(laughs). At one time I was told that I declared that 
somebody was spying on me and walking around my bed with 
little chinese feet and then I said that it was my mother 
and then my sister just packed up laughing because she 
couldn't handle it anymore and went over to call my father 
to see if he could make any sense of it, and then I saw 
this nurse walk past and I yelled at her "come here!" and 
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I said to her, "do you realize that I have wasted my entire 
-professional' life," I said "that I could be making a 'fortune 
as a comedian," and then these highly serious people just 
packed up laughing. 
The rest of it, you know I was described as being extremely 
up and coming, I like, I ran the hospital, I organized 
it. Throughout my stay in hospital I had the place cased. 
Even the turning, every two hours and every four hours, 
first they would tell you to relax and then they would 
count and shout ONE TWO THREE! It'~ like the idea of how 
you get a kid to jump off a cupboard, you know, ONE TWO 
THREE! it's a highly unrelaxing noise. And then, there 
was a young nursing assistant named X, and one day she 
came along with some people, like of her own rank and in 
a very calm voice she said, just try and relax, breathe, 
O.K. one, two, three, turn, and this was like the best 
turn going, not ONE TWO THREE! The next time she arrived, 
there were a whole lot of other nurses around~ four who 
outranked her, and they arrived at my bed, and I said 
listen, I'd like to discuss something before we start this, 
I want X to do the counting. X says NOl And they all 
say ugh, you're just being difficult again, and I said, 
if X doesn't count, I scream, take your choice. 
R: Can you tell me a little about your relationship with 
the other patients, I mean what was it like? 
C: It was quite difficult, because quite a lot of them 
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were Afrikaans and they were racist to the core, and also, 
I was them9st physically -luc,ky guy in that ward, just 
about all of the time. 
R: Can you tell me a little more about the racist thing? 
-C: Well, the fact that they would actually exhibit their 
-racism to black nurses who had them absolutely helpless, 
blew me away. I thought, are you okes crazy or what. One 
night, there was some comment about this woman, about Y, 
a black woman being appointed the head of the SABC, and 
they were saying that this was a real fuck up, and what's 
going to happen, and so on, and it was then that I said, 
well actually, what do you think is going to happen because 
of this, and it was then that they actually twigged, Uh-
Oh 
R: We have a links, liberaal creature in our midst? 
C: Yes, but not only that, but also, more interestingly, 
that the old flag was taken down. 
R: You mean metaphorically? 
C: Yes, that the old system was gone, that they are 
actually oddballs these days. So it was quite hard, because 
there weren't too many people I could relate to, among 
the other patients. 
R: Where would you say that most of your support came 
from? 
C: My parents. My parents came up from P.E. and they 
were staying in a convent nearby, and they would come and 
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see me everyday, between three o'clock and five o'clock, 
and I would say that it builtuur relationship. You know, 
one is able to spend time, and two, when things are that 
intense, you either deal with what's going down, or you 
bury it. And my folks are really amazing people, they 
-learn from their kids. So, by the way, to add to this 
thing with X, you know, I eventually twigged, that I can 
count. I mean what do I do if X is not there, so I said, 
O.K. I count, and for a second they wanted to argue with 
me, and I said you're gonna argue and you're losing the 
seconds anyway. I count, I count slower than you, but 
I count, or else I'll scream, and they would go into this 
whole sort of thing like, men shouldn't scream, and other 
things, like there was this one time when there was 
something wrong with the E.C.G. machine before my second 
operation, and there was something wrong with the stickers, 
they put them on and then they pulled them off and they 
had this really strong view on it, and I said I'll be damned 
if you're pulling my chest hairs off again because it's 
damn sore, and she said, no man, don't be such a baby, 
and I said no, I'm not available, we're not debating whether 
I'm masculine or not, what we're debating is the state 
of your eardrums, I said if you do it, then I'm gonna make 
sure that your eardrums get as painful as my chest. 
R: O.K. I think I'm seeing a pattern here. What you seem 
to be saying here is that there is a lot of illogicality 
on the part of some of the staff, regarding procedure, 
-and you seem to have deali w~th it on a logical, and" 
rational level, by debating the merits of the procedure 
and, in so doing, take more responsibility for yourself? 
and also show to them, that you're not just a piece of 
-meat to be shoved around? 
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c: Absolutely. Like I took complete responsibility for 
my medication, I would not take anything unless they could 
explain to me what it was. 
R: O.K. there's another thing I'd still like to touch 
on, if you don't mind. The first time I spoke to you, 
you said that there were similarities, between your 
experience in detention, and your experience in the 
hospital, could you tell me a little more about that? 
C: Well, the similarity is the complete lack of control, 
you don't decide when to sleep, like whether to eat, you 
don't decide who comes to see you. Ja, the sense that, 
that somebody else is ~n control. And also, the time. 
I was in detention for 5~ months and in the hospital for 
5~ months, and also, there were different pros and cons 
as well. The fact that there wasn't any kind of 
malevolence, you know, a force that was keeping me there, 
that's a different thing to deal with. The fact that you 
have so much access to people, instead of half an hour 
a week. And another similarity was, that you have no idea 
when you're going to get out. 
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R: Before, when we first spoke, you mentioned the fact 
that there were some humorous moments in the hospita~. 
Could you give me an example, something you recall? 
C: There were actually lots of funny things. One of the 
guys, a really chauvinist Afrikaner, one night he~tells 
us this story, you know, he's trying to deal with this 
crisis, so he started off saying Ita pomp is a pomp, maar 
as jy eers getroud is, is dit 'n avontuur." You know, 
a fuck is a fuck until you're married and then it becomes 
an adventure. And he was going on about his sexploits, 
one of the delirious moments he had, he kept on telling 
his brother that the S.A.P. were looking for him and they 
were coming to get him, right here and now, and his brother 
says, like why are they coming to get you, and he says, 
no, it's because I fucked around too much, and then he 
remembers that he picked up some woman in some dorpie while 
he was in the army, and he was screwing her in the graveyard 
and the cops checked people moving in the graveyard, and 
he ran, all the way back to the army camp, through the 
town without his clothes on. 
R: Can you tell me a little about your attitude to sex, 
you know how you felt about it, initially after the 
accident? 
C: Initially, there was so much pain and drugs and 
what-not, that I didn't actually connect with the idea 
of sex, and then, one day, they changed my catheter, and 
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I realized that, shit, you know If they did this to me 
__ and I had fe~ling here, there <w.ould be a problem. Oh., 
it was quite a freakout, Ja. There were lectures by this 
guy from the neurology department and this guy had the 
most incredibly dry sense of humour, and he sta£fs' saying, 
J haven't come here to teach you any kinky positions, so 
let's just deal with a couple of facts first, the largest 
sexual organ in your body is your skin, and the most 
important sexual organ is your brain, and he made an 
extremely good presentation, and then went on to sex aids 
and what, and he also covered a couple of social-sexual 
issues, and I thought he was good, but also extremely male 
orientated. And I understood after speaking to some other 
patients that the women were never spoken to. 
e: You know, I went into severe anxiety, before my second 
OP, which was three weeks after the first one. The first 
OP was a major OP, they sliced me from the back around 
the front and fused the front of the vertebra, and they 
had to go into my chest cavity as well as my stomach cavity, 
T12 to L2, to cover L1 which was smashed, and I was worried, 
because I'd seen someone have a fusion, and I'd seen him 
coming out of the operating room with his eyes popping 
out of his head with pain. Then the second OP, I was 
vomiting, I couldn't eat, I went into major anxiety. My 
main fear was pain. I was still involved with stuff 
outside, while I was totally bed ridden. I had been 
involved, just before my accident, trying to set up a job 
creation program that was operating in the townships. 
I recruited someone from his bed, to become one of our 
local directors, and we actually ended up having an AGM 
around my bed, which was amazing. 
R: Let me just ask you something straight out. Do you 
think that you were in denial at any stage? 
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C: Yes. You know, I suddenly realized one day after corning 
out of a meeting, that I had a subconscious fantasy that 
I was very sick and that I would become completely well. 
If anybody had questioned me at any -point, I would not 
have said that this is what I believe. Initially they 
said that I was not going to w~lk at all, and then I got 
this return and they said that I was going to walk- on 
crutches, they said they were pretty sure that some nerves 
were completely dead, but that I would walk on crutches. 
At a very early stage it was an issue for me, but not now~ 
And I also want so say something else, vis-a-vis being 
in the hospital, that one of the things that people need 
to be told is "welcome to an oppressed group." Let's get 
away from this individual tragedy model and corne to terms 
with the fact that part of anybody's life is that they're 
a political animal, and that everyone has a fear and a 
horror of being disabled. It's like during apartheid you 
had these coloured people who were always trying for white. 
Some disabled people are still trying for white, i.e trying 
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for able bodied, but it will never happen, they will always 
-be part of an oppressed gr-oup •. Discrimination isreal, 
and until you deal with that fact, you will remain a stunted 
individual, emotionally, individually and socially. And 
one other thing that I'd like to say about this entire 
-thing is that I redid my entire childhood, I had to learn 
to rollover, I was fed via a nose tube, I was dressed, 
bathed, learnt to rollover, learnt to crawl, learned to 
feed myself. I felt as if I redid my childhood, that I 
did a rewind of my whole life. 
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